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Individuals in any organization will often find themselves working in groups, 
either by force, necessity, or through volunteering. Group work is something everyone 
must do, and learning how to make the best of every situation and group opportunity can 
be the difference between a positive or negative experience. This study explores the 
communication within decision-making groups where a poor outcome or decision 
occurred. By examining the concept of groupthink, we can enhance our understanding of 
the factors influencing the group decision-making process and how communication can 
benefit organizations. This specific study expands the current body of knowledge on 
groupthink by developing an instrument to effectively measure a group’s tendency 
toward groupthink; a type of faulty decision-making. It examines the relationship 
between the concept of groupthink and the variables of highly cohesive groups, 
promotional leadership, conformity, concurrence seeking, anxiety, collective efficacy, 
hidden profiles, and trust, in an attempt to develop a scale to access a group’s propensity 
to commit groupthink.  
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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Group work is a domain in which almost every individual will have multiple 
experiences. Learning how to properly develop and enhance decision-making processes 
within groups can be the difference between a positive or negative experience and 
outcome. According to Gunnarsson (2010), groups, teams, or committees make many of 
the decisions made in organizations. The benefits of group decision-making include 
generating more information and knowledge, producing more diverse opinions, and 
enhancing acceptance of a decision (Robbins & Judge, 2011); however, not all of these 
things work out beneficially during group decision-making processes. The difference 
between good and poor decision-making is an important issue within the study of group 
communication. Many social psychologists have argued, “humans would do better 
without groups” (Buys, 1978, p. 123). “To err is human” is a cliché used by those who 
dismiss fiascoes, miscalculations, and disastrous results of a collective misjudgment 
(Janis, 1972, p. 2). According to Janis, “platitudinous thoughts about human nature do not 
help us to understand how and why human miscalculations are made” (p. 2). Instead, 
Janis also said, “groups can bring out the worst as well as the best in human decision-
making” (p. 3). Learning how to make the most of these group experiences is something 
of vital importance in an increasingly interconnected social world.  
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One of the more influential concepts about group decision-making processes is 
groupthink, which specifies several antecedents that function together to lead to poor 
decision-making. These antecedents include high group cohesiveness, a stressful 
situation, and various structural or administrative factors such as the insulation of the 
group, promotional leadership, a lack of sound decision-making procedures, and a lack of 
diversity or variety in values and perspectives of group members. Since it is difficult to 
clearly define most of its variables, operationalizing groupthink is also tough. 
Additionally, because there is no consensus about how to measure the variables 
associated with groupthink, there is a lack of standardization between measures and 
approaches to studying groupthink by researchers, making  it challenging to consistently 
and accurately measure groupthink, or to compare and contrast results of groupthink 
studies. This is why developing an appropriate measure for the variables associated with 
groupthink, to better understand what predicts groupthink and test a group’s propensity 
toward it, is so important.  
Due to its negative nature, groupthink has garnered a large amount of attention in 
scholarship on group communication, and as a function to understanding conflict 
resolution and expressing disagreements in the larger scheme of communication, it is 
practical to study in the field. Considering the potential reach to groups not only in 
academia, but also in government, politics, and other important areas of society, 
groupthink is certainly worthy of analysis. Thus, by examining groupthink, one can begin 
to understand the factors influencing the occurrence of the phenomenon and, then, how it 
could be avoided.  
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Understanding the predictors of and possible solutions to groupthink may also 
increase several positive dimensions of group interactions such as performance and 
satisfaction together. The present study develops a self-report survey instrument to 
effectively measure the propensity a group has toward groupthink, while the predictors at 
play serve as a guide, warning a group when the telltale signs of groupthink begin to 
emerge. The ultimate goal is to find the relationship between eight independent variables, 
how they lead to the explanation and prediction of groupthink, and how they are evident 
in the way groups communicate. 
The first chapter will begin by revisiting Janis’ (1972, 1982) groupthink model, 
then incorporate the eight symptoms and six decision-making defects of groupthink Janis 
determined to be synonymous with this phenomenon. Next, an overview of the history of 
groupthink research will be presented, followed by a conceptualization of the principal 
variables that are hypothesized to be essential to the present study and the study of 
groupthink: highly cohesive, promotional leadership, conformity, concurrence seeking, 
anxiety, collective efficacy, hidden profiles, and trust. 
Groupthink 
Communication is fundamental to people as social beings, and working together 
on tasks as a group or team is a major aspect of social life. Groups use communication to 
increase mutual understanding, define goal-oriented behavior, and coordinate individual 
behavior within groups; therefore, theories from communication science can help 
understand important communication processes and group approaches to behavior 
coordination, and where they might go wrong, as in cases when groupthink occurs. 
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Irving Janis, a faculty member in psychology at Yale University, coined the term 
“groupthink” to describe how certain conditions can lead a group to be highly satisfied 
with what turns out to be an ineffective decision. Groupthink is a mode of thinking in 
which members of a highly cohesive group strive for unanimity and consensus, 
overriding their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (Janis, 
1972, 1982). Cohesiveness is the degree of mutual interest a group has. It is usually a 
good thing as it can bring the members of a group together, but it has its dangers. For 
example, the more cohesiveness a group has, the more pressure it puts onto members of 
that group to maintain the cohesiveness through its communication. In turn, the group 
invests more of its energy in keeping this cohesiveness intact than it does in making the 
right decision. Janis (1972, 1982) identified the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion, the escalation of the War in Vietnam, and the Watergate cover-up as examples 
of case studies on groupthink. Although Janis’ (1972, 1982) analyses of groupthink 
focused primarily on political and military decisions, the potential for groupthink to occur 
in any organization is equally plausible (Finkelstein, 2003; Miller, 1990; Tasa & Whyte, 
2005). This is why the groupthink phenomenon has important ramifications for the study 
of both group and organizational communication.  
However, before fully exploring groupthink, it has to be clear what constitutes a 
group. According to Moreland (2010), what separates groups from dyads is that groups 
do not form or dissolve as quickly, the way people feel emotions and express them are 
different, and the different phenomena that occur in groups are more complex. Based 
upon these arguments, a group is different from a dyad and identified by having three or 
more members. For a group to form, relationships among three or more people are 
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needed, and these include relationships between each pair of people, relationships 
between each person and the subgroup(s) to which they belong, and relationships 
between each individual and the group as a whole (Moreland, 2010). Within a dyad, 
damage to a single relationship is enough to make the dyad dissolve, but if there is 
damage to only one relationship in a group, the group can still survive. This complexity 
of group communication is part of what makes studying groups so multifaceted, intricate, 
and interesting to researchers. The challenge of studying groups is complicated even 
further when trying to distinguish or compare between groups and teams, and between 
face-to-face, virtual, or dispersed groups. Also of interest to this study is distinguishing 
face-to-face groups from virtual groups to test for potential differences between 
participant responses.  
Five-step Casual Model 
Groupthink is a five-step causal model represented by five stages. Janis and Mann 
(1977) first developed this model. The first stage is the antecedent stage, which includes 
the group having high levels of cohesiveness, structural defects, and being involved in a 
proactive situational context. Structural defects include insulation, a lack of leader 
impartiality, a lack of procedural norms, and member homogeneity. Provocative 
situational contexts include low group efficacy and high stress. The second stage of the 
groupthink model is concurrence seeking, which is the tendency of group members to 
agree openly even if they privately disagree. The third stage is when the group 
experiences any or all of the eight symptoms of groupthink, which are collective 
rationalizations, pressure to conform, the emergence of mindguards, biased perceptions 
of the out-group, self-censorship, an illusion of invulnerability, an illusion of morality, 
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and an illusion of unanimity. The fourth stage of the groupthink model is when the group 
exhibits the six decision-making defects, which are the failure to examine alternative 
ideas, the failure to examine preferred alternatives, having a selected bias when 
processing information, having no contingency plans, rejecting opinions of experts, and 
failing to reexamine rejected alternatives. The final stage of the groupthink model is a 
poor decision outcome.  
The first stage of the groupthink model, the antecedent stage, is deserving of 
closer explanation. Janis (1982) said that groupthink is most likely to occur when three 
antecedent conditions are present. Cohesiveness is the first and most important of these 
antecedent conditions, and is what Janis called the greatest single hazard that can cause 
groupthink to occur. The second antecedent is organizational structural faults, which 
include insulation of the group, a lack of impartial leadership, a lack of systematic or 
procedural group norms, homogeneity of group members, and narrow parameters on 
acceptable solutions set by the leader of the group. Janis argued that the more a leader 
communicates and promotes their own preferred decision, the more likely it is that the 
group will arrive at a consensus without fully examining other potential options. The 
third antecedent is situational factors, which include high stress from external factors and 
temporary low self-esteem induced by recent failures, excessive difficulties, or moral 
dilemmas. Despite his assertion about the importance of high levels of cohesiveness, 
Janis said that groupthink could not occur if any or all of the antecedents were not 
present; thusly, Janis portrayed all antecedents as equally important.  
Groupthink refers to a premature striving by members of a group to reach a 
unanimous agreement on a decision or course of action. Groupthink is undesirable as it 
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cuts off necessary and important considerations or communication of the benefits and 
consequences of the different decision options (Ahlfinger & Esser, 2001). Groupthink is 
identifiable by eight symptoms; each representing different ways group members can try 
to avoid or reduce the anxiety associated with decision-making and protect their self-
esteem (Janis, 1982). These symptoms are viewable in three types. Type I symptoms 
involve overestimating the group, meaning that group members share an illusion of their 
invulnerability and unquestioned belief that their cause is just. Type II symptoms involve 
close-mindedness, meaning that group members collectively rationalize and avoid 
information that is inconsistent with their preferred choice and stereotype enemies as 
stupid or weak. Lastly, Type III symptoms involve a pressure toward uniformity, 
meaning that members of the group often self-censor their own concerns about the 
group’s choice, creating and adding to a shared illusion of the group being unanimous in 
its acceptance of a majority decision. In addition, the group can communicate direct 
pressure on those who express dissenting viewpoints, and members may additionally take 
on the role of mindguards to “protect the group” from outside information which could 
threaten or challenge the confidence of the group’s decision (Ahlfinger & Esser, 2001). 
Janis (1972) said that the frequency and pronouncement of the symptoms of groupthink 
are direct predictors of the quality level of a group’s decision. “The more frequently a 
group displays the symptoms, the worse the quality of its decisions will be. Even when 
some symptoms are absent, the others may be so pronounced that we can predict all the 
unfortunate consequences of groupthink” (Janis, 1972, p. 198). The symptoms of 
groupthink as proposed by Janis will serve as the jumping off point for the present study, 
but only a few of them are actual variables used as predictors of groupthink in the current 
8 
instrument. These decisions were based upon the frequency of attention and overall 
support each groupthink variable has garnered since Janis’ (1972, 1982) original 
conception of the model, and takes into consideration new variables proposed in alternate 
groupthink models.  
Critique of casual model. Part of the need for the current study and reason to 
research in this area is the problematic nature of Janis’ (1972, 1982) casual model. 
Simply put, groupthink does not always occur given the same set of circumstances or 
with the same predictors in place. What leads to groupthink does not always cause it, 
making it difficult to establish causality in any line of groupthink research. Therefore, a 
predictive model, stated in a more tentative manner, with a focus on the group’s 
communication process and the skills one can learn to enhance their group decision, as 
opposed to the result itself, is more appropriate.  
Solutions to Groupthink 
There are nine steps to solving the groupthink problem in decision-making 
groups. These steps were proposed by Janis (1972, 1982, 1989). The first step is to 
encourage everyone in the group to be a critical evaluator and to express reservations 
during the decision-making process. Second, do not have the leader state a preference up 
front. Third, set up several independent and separate policy making groups. The fourth 
step is to divide the group into subgroups, and the fifth step is to discuss what is 
happening with others outside of the group. Inviting outsiders into the group to bring in 
fresh ideas is the sixth step, and assigning an individual at each meeting to be the devil’s 
advocate is the seventh step. The eighth step is to spend considerable time surveying 
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warning signals. The final step to solving the groupthink problem as proposed by Janis is 
to hold a second-chance meeting to reconsider decisions before finalizing them.  
Some of Janis’ (1972, 1982, 1989) recommendations to prevent groupthink have 
been widely accepted, such as appointing a devil’s advocate, introducing outside voices 
and allowing brainstorming to occur without judgment or criticism. However, throughout 
the years, his original concept has been criticized, especially the conditions he described 
as necessary for groupthink to occur, such as internal cohesion, crisis, pressure, group 
insulation and members with similar ideologies and backgrounds (Cohen & DeBenedet, 
2012). These critiques of the proposed model, and subsequent changes, such as Whyte’s 
(1998) and Moorhead, Ference, and Neck’s (1991) models , work as the theoretical basis 
for the argument of developing a groupthink measure.  
In sum, groupthink is more likely to emerge when groups are overly cohesive and 
try to reach consensus prematurely. It arrives out of a culture of self-censorship and 
mindguards, which are individuals who communicate to try to shut down the ideas of 
others and promote a consensus. It involves a high amount of overconfidence, which is 
when the group thinks “we cannot possibly all be wrong,” leading to a potentially 
disastrous decision or nagging problem. This topic is important to study from a 
communication perspective because an absence of effective communication and 
disagreements are what allow groupthink to take hold, and because the predictor 
variables in this study, conceptualized and operationalized from a communicative lens, 
offer a way to study the phenomenon from a forward thinking outlook.  
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Empirical Study of Groupthink 
Currently, work is still needed to test, be able to measure, and further understand 
groupthink. Many of the original components, such as the different antecedents, of the 
theory have been questioned, examined, and have had changes proposed to them. One of 
the most influential and often cited changes to the original groupthink model was 
Whyte’s (1998) replacement of cohesiveness with self-efficacy in a new model. 
According to Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Field (1992), there is strong 
evidence that Janis’ (1972, 1982) depiction of the groupthink model and functioning of 
the decision making groups he described is both accurate and consistent with that of other 
historical observations. However, according to Whyte (1998), the evidence is far less 
convincing that the groupthink model provides the best explanation for events of decision 
making that have produced disastrous outcomes. Moorhead and Montanari (1986) said 
that empirical analysis has seldom completely supported Janis’ original model and 
conclusions. Perhaps one reason for this is the failure of Janis to develop a concise 
theoretical framework in his original book. In his 1982 version of groupthink, Janis 
shows an illustrated model and discusses the theoretical framework, allowing for a more 
precise interpretation of the causal sequence he alluded to in his 1972 work (Moorhead & 
Montanari, 1986). Additionally, groupthink has been studied within a laboratory 
paradigm (e.g., Cline, 1990; Courtright, 1978), which adds to the perspectives of how it 
can be tested. 
Since groupthink mainly deals with fiascos, or disastrous decisions or outcomes, 
individuals involved with the decision generally look back on the decision-making 
process, and researchers who study these decisions are prone to look back on events after 
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the fact. This is known as retrospective sensemaking (Henningsen, 2002), which means 
scholars attempt to retroactively understand or cognitively process their environment 
after something has occurred (Louis, 1990). Sensemaking approaches say that after 
individuals act, they use information from their surroundings and from their own 
experiences to rank and understand their performance. Guzzo, Wagner, Maguire, Herr, 
and Hawley (1986) found that when one provides participants with information about a 
negative group outcome, the participants also infer a negative decision-making process 
had occurred within the group. This is important to take into consideration to understand 
why people are prone to make certain evaluations about their past performances or group 
activities.  
Groupthink can be studied in a laboratory, but the results of such studies have 
been inconsistent and include deviations from Janis’ (1972, 1982) original model. 
According to Park (2000), groupthink has received little support in laboratory settings, 
despite its far-reaching and influential nature. Research on groupthink has tended to look 
at only limited components of the groupthink model (e.g., Bernthal & Insko, 1993; 
Callaway & Esser, 1984; Cline, 1990; Courtright, 1978; Flowers, 1977; Fodor & Smith, 
1982; Leana, 1985). Additionally, some studies only look at factors outside of the model 
(e.g., Kroon, Hart, & Kreveld, 1991; Kroon, Kreveld, & Rabbie, 1992). Despite all of 
this, Janis (1982) said that groupthink occurs in groups with few deletions or changes 
from his proposed model. Aside from its prominence in decision-making literature, 
experimental support for the groupthink model has been weak at best, even when it is 
fully tested. On the other side, case studies and content analyses have produced more 
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support for groupthink (Park, 2000). Thus, there is need for a more consistent way to 
measure the phenomenon. 
Case Studies 
An increasing number of case studies have applied groupthink, most of which 
review political and military decisions similar to the cases Janis (1972, 1982) originally 
evaluated. However, the breadth of the application of groupthink case studies continues 
to expand, as case studies have been completed on organizational decisions, like the 
baseball umpire strike of 1999 (Koerber & Neck, 2003), organizational strategies, and 
fraudulent behavior of organizations. Most case studies only use a subset of the 
groupthink model, usually the symptoms of groupthink (Rose, 2011). Additionally, case 
studies often involve a retrospective application to decision fiascos and groupthink (e.g., 
Hensley, & Griffin, 1986; Moorhead et al., 1991; Neck, 1996; Neck, Godwin, & Spencer, 
1996; Neck & Moorhead, 1992). Most case studies on groupthink focus on governmental, 
military, and business decision-making disasters. 
Case study researchers usually look for the presence of the antecedent conditions 
and symptoms of groupthink in real-world scenarios where defective decision-making 
was apparent. For example, Kramer (1998) used new evidence to re-analyze the Bay of 
Pigs failure; Moorhead et al. (1991) examined the Challenger tragedy; and Eaton (2001) 
considered two cases from British corporate management. These researchers found some 
of the antecedent conditions of groupthink related to the presence of groupthink 
symptoms, but only in differing combinations. Although their results provide general 
support for the groupthink model, what this means is that while groupthink does indeed 
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occur from time to time, the factors or predictors that trigger groupthink are unclear or at 
the minimum vary in their effect in different situations.  
Experimental Studies 
There are less than 25 studies identified as experiments addressing various 
groupthink elements. Most studies select participants with little to zero history and/or 
future, and little to no cohesion, put them into groups of three to six, and then have the 
participants complete a decision-making task of some type, usually with a time pressure 
of 20 to 40 minutes. Additionally, questionnaires are implemented usually before and 
after the decision-making task, and, lastly, video or audio tapes of the decision-making 
process are analyzed (Rose, 2011). Despite this number of empirical studies on 
groupthink, there is very little agreement among researchers on the validity of the model 
(Park, 2000).  
Laboratory studies have generally tested the presence and strength of linear 
relationships between antecedent conditions and the symptoms of groupthink. Similar to 
the results of groupthink case studies, experimental studies on groupthink provide only 
partial support for the model. Neck and Moorhead (1995) said that most of the studies on 
groupthink focus on interactive effects of cohesiveness and structural faults. Neck and 
Moorhead, as well as Aldag and Fuller (1993) and McCauley (1989), showed that the 
best predictors of groupthink were a closed leadership style and a lack of precise 
procedures for decision-making. Longley and Pruitt (1980) found that the presence of 
structural faults increased the tendency for early development of a norm toward a certain 
decision in cohesive groups, which might explain the symptoms of bad or defective 
decision-making in groups. Lastly, closed or directive leaders who discourage diverse 
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opinions and promote their own favored opinion induce fewer suggestions from their 
group (Flowers, 1977; Leana, 1985). This emphasis on closed, directive, or promotional 
leadership serves as the basis for one of the present study’s hypothesized variables. 
Well-tested Variables 
The three variables of groupthink tested the most are group cohesion, group 
insulation, and impartial leadership. Tests of impartial leadership have produced 
consistent support of the groupthink model, as lower-power leaders (Fodor & Smith, 
1982), open-leaders (Flowers, 1977), and non-directive leaders (Leana, 1985), have all 
been shown to facilitate discussion and the generation of new ideas. Group insulation has 
been found to reduce decision quality (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986). Lastly, tests on 
group cohesion have produced mixed results (Rose, 2011). Bouncing off this information, 
promotional leadership and highly cohesive groups are two of the variables hypothesized 
in the present study to be key predictors of groupthink.  
Mixed Results 
The vast majority of research on groupthink examines only disastrous or negative 
outcomes; however, a growing number of scholars (e.g., Flippen, 1999; Hirokawa, 
Gouran, & Martz, 1988; Kramer & Dougherty, 2013) have argued that groupthink does 
not always lead to a less than optimal result. Groupthink is usually only considered when 
the outcome of a group decision is disastrous, and this is due to the early tradition of 
work on groupthink set forth by Janis (1972). According to Turner and Pratkanis (1998), 
the defining characteristic of most groupthink research is that groupthink results in 
extremely defective decision-making by the group. Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, and 
Martorana (1998) even said, “groupthink is the primary cause of fiasco in the modern 
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world” (p. 273). However, Flippen, in a study of the Bay of Pigs invasion, stated that 
groupthink does not necessarily result in bad decisions. This is the key part of the catch-
22 involved with studying groupthink and attempting to develop an instrument to 
measure it. If the same symptoms do not always lead to a bad decision, then it can be 
tough to report it as such or even look back at the experience as groupthink 
retrospectively.  
 Due to a focus on bad or disastrous decisions, instead of examining the 
communication process associated with decision-making, most of the research on 
groupthink locates examples of poor decision-making outcomes and works backwards 
through retrospective sensemaking to find evidence of groupthink (Fuller & Aldag, 
1998). Kramer and Dougherty (2013) concluded that groupthink always involves poor 
decision-making processes, but that groupthink can also lead to negative, ambiguous, or 
even positive or successful outcomes. This suggests that research on groupthink should 
focus more on the communication process of the group, rather than the decision outcome. 
That is what this study attempts to address.  
 One of the other challenges with studying groupthink is the use of retrospective 
sensemaking as opposed to implementing a measure to look at it from a forward 
perspective. According to Kramer and Dougherty (2013), the previous research on 
groupthink represents a bias because nearly all typical examples of groupthink begin with 
negative or disastrous outcomes, and then work to examine, retrospectively, the faulty 
decision-making processes. Although Kramer and Dougherty admitted that using 
groupthink decision-making processes increased the chances of poor decisions and 
negative outcomes, the increased probability of a negative outcomes does not 
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automatically cause a negative outcome every time. According to Hirokawa et al. (1988), 
the same groupthink processes leading to the Challenger disaster occurred on the July 
1985 space shuttle flight, on which the O-rings came dangerously close to failing because 
of cold temperatures; however, the difference in the outcomes was due to almost random, 
unpredictable factors, rather than differences in the decision-making processes.   
There have been a few other studies regarding groupthink and the Challenger 
disaster. Esser and Lindoerfer (1989) studied the Challenger accident through the lens of 
groupthink and used the Presidential Commission’s report on the shuttle’s accident as 
their data. Of the 88 statements drawn from the record, Esser and Lindoerfer identified 39 
as instances of groupthink. Although Esser and Lindoerfer did not find all of the 
symptoms of groupthink in their analysis, two symptoms that were rather apparent were 
putting direct pressure on dissenters and mindguarding. Esser and Lindoerfer pointed out 
that “groupthink does not require all observable antecedents and consequences to be 
present in order for it to occur” (p. 176). These types of comments about groupthink are 
just another example of Janis’ (1972, 1982) original model not being fully accepted by 
empirical research.  
 Another analysis of the Challenger accident and groupthink found that time 
pressure and leadership style are two moderating variables that should be considered 
when it comes to groupthink cases. Moorhead et al. (1991) studied the Challenger 
accident, but looked at the Level 1 Flight Readiness Review meeting. They found that the 
report they looked at showed “enough evidence of the antecedent conditions, the 
symptoms, and the decision-making defects to support a conclusion that the decision to 
launch can be classified as a groupthink situation” (Moorhead et al., 1991, p. 549). 
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Additionally, they proposed two additional variables that act as moderators to group 
characteristics: time pressure and leadership style. According to Moorhead et al., the 
most effective leadership style for avoiding groupthink is “a strong, demanding leader 
who forces critical appraisal of all alternatives” (p. 549). To illustrate the impact of these 
two additional variables, the authors constructed a revised groupthink model. This new 
model is just one of the many types of proposed changes that groupthink has been subject 
to over the years, but its contributions are of great importance to the study of groupthink. 
Therefore, leadership style is considered as a predictor variable in this study, while time 
pressure is accounted for jointly with the proposed independent variable of anxiety. 
Debate about Groupthink Model 
Several articles have been written addressing the status of Janis’ (1972, 1982) 
groupthink model. As Paulus (1998) said, “the model represents a brilliant construction 
founded in part on the existing group dynamics literature” (p. 371). Raven (1998) said he 
“hoped the work by Janis and his followers would sensitize policy makers and other 
decision groups about what they might do to counter the effects of groupthink” (p. 360). 
However, groupthink also has its critics. Baron (2005) said, “after many years of 
investigation, evidence has largely failed to support the formulation’s more ambitious and 
controversial predictions” (p. 219). As Henningsen, Henningsen, Eden, and Cruz (2006) 
stated, “questions can be raised as to the utility of using groupthink theory before 
research” (p. 62). Lastly, Fuller and Aldag (1998) said, “groupthink is a compelling myth. 
Like other myths, it tells of things that never were but always are. How did we come to so 
widely and gladly accept it in the absence of compelling evidence” (p. 177)? These 
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reviews effectively highlight the controversy and disagreements surrounding groupthink 
and the current state of the model. 
Over a period of several decades, the groupthink model has generated a 
considerable amount of research and writing. However, the results of these studies only 
provide partial support of the model (Aldag & Fuller, 1993; McCauley, 1989; McCauley, 
1998). Additionally, many of the variables originally associated with groupthink are 
flimsy in their conceptual definitions and connections to the phenomenon. Similarly, 
Rose (2011) suggested a problematic issue with operationalizing groupthink is that most 
of its variables are not well defined. Because of this, researchers have had to develop 
their own measures and unique approaches to studying groupthink. Therefore, no 
consensus exists as to how to operationalize the antecedents of groupthink or how to 
measure the other variables (Esser, 1998). The lack of standardization makes it very 
difficult to be able to compare, contrast, or combine results of studies. Another problem 
is the difficulty in creating the kind of cohesive group Janis’ (1982) original model uses. 
Not only had Janis sought to clarify and improve his model, but so have numerous other 
researchers and studies. Although there have not been many recent studies looking to 
reexamine or improve the groupthink model, the work being done in this area is certainly 
not complete. Most studies use ad hoc groups, but these groups have limited cohesion 
among members of the group as they are put together for the sake of the study and are not 
allowed to work together long enough to fully develop the cohesiveness needed for true 
groupthink to occur. The previous information about the history of the study of 
groupthink and its lack of clear and consistent results due to a lack of standardization of 
the variables associated with groupthink, showcases the necessity of developing a new 
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instrument to measure the variables associated with groupthink through a communication 
perspective. Thus, two research questions are posited to drive the focus for this study: 
RQ1:  What is the factor structure of the groupthink instrument? 
RQ2:  What is the reliability of the groupthink instrument, and any subscales that 
are derived? 
Relatively speaking, groupthink has stood the test of time. As it stands, 
groupthink is considered by many to be one of the most important group communication 
problems. The implications groupthink has on organizations, organizational 
communication, and group work within organizations are well understood; yet it has not 
been conceptualized or studied in such a way that it can be measured consistently. The 
present study will seek to do just that by clearly defining the concepts hypothesized to be 
evident in groupthink groups. This study seeks to measure groupthink in a way that 
allows it to access a group’s predisposition to an outcome or nagging problem 
characterized by groupthink.  
Groupthink Variables 
Highly Cohesive 
One of the more prominently associated and most often studied variables 
associated with groupthink is group cohesiveness. Janis (1972) originally identified high 
group cohesiveness as the “chief culprit” behind groupthink and bad decisions. He said, 
“the more ambiguity and esprit de corps among members of a group, the greater is the 
danger that independent, critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink” (p. 13). 
Moorhead and Montanari (1986) showed the importance of utilizing groups that had 
already been together for a significant amount of time, interacting and making highly 
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significant decisions together, to study groupthink; whereas, other research efforts try to 
quickly induce cohesion by bringing together ad hoc groups. Since cohesiveness is the 
primary antecedent condition of groupthink, it must develop over time and be present in 
some degree before the decision situation in which groupthink might occur for it to be 
truly “antecedent” (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986). This is the problem researchers 
encounter when trying to conduct experimental studies on groupthink; however, an 
instrument allowing participants to reflect on their group experiences that likely involved 
high levels of cohesion has the potential to be more successful at getting at the concept of 
groupthink.  
When it comes to communication, it is important for groups to remain critical and 
ask questions during deliberations. According to Glaser (1993), groupthink seems to 
develop as a group becomes more cohesive and less critical of its own decisions. For 
example, a group may decide on a plan of action that only a few of the members propose 
and support, but without debate or critical thinking, the rest of the group goes along with 
the plan due to a greater concern for unanimity and solidarity, outweighing the desire to 
discuss other, and maybe more valid, alternatives. The result of a group believing in the 
correctness of a position and ignoring conflicting viewpoints is that the decision might be 
of such poor quality that it fails to live up to its intended purpose and may even create a 
more serious problem (Glaser, 1993). Cohesion is essentially a controlling force within 
groups, and that compliance toward the group or the accepted authority tends to be very 
high in cohesive groups (Hackman, 1992). According to Janis (1982), at the extreme end 
of the cohesion continuum, cohesiveness becomes an ingredient in groupthink where the 
group focuses more on the preservation of the group and their status within the group 
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instead of efficient and effective engagement in the task. Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, and 
Leve (1992) said that this process is rooted in identity preservation. Hackman concluded 
that highly cohesive groups will be less likely to generate truly innovative ideas or 
approaches to a task among themselves since individual effort and attention is consumed 
with staying within the boundaries set by group norms and experiences within the group. 
No one in the group wants to be the person who, simply put, “rocks the boat.” This leads 
to the present study’s first hypothesis: 
H1: As group cohesion increases, the chances of committing groupthink also 
increases.  
Due to the confusion over groupthink and many of its variables, some researchers 
have argued against the inclusion of group cohesiveness in the groupthink model. Hogg 
and Hains (1998) proposed that previous research on groupthink had failed to clarify the 
causal role of group cohesiveness in groupthink due to a failure of being able to 
distinguish cohesiveness from friendship. To fix this, Hogg (1992) used social identity 
theory to create a conceptual distinction between positive regard (personal attraction, 
friendship) and solidarity (depersonalized social attraction, true group cohesiveness). 
They predicted that group identification and social attraction would be associated with 
the symptoms of groupthink because they are associated with depersonalization, which 
reinforces symptoms of groupthink such as a general striving for conformity, concurrence 
seeking, and agreement. They also said that personal attraction would not be associated 
with groupthink because it is associated with individuality and interpersonal 
differentiation, none of which are symptoms of groupthink. Hogg and Hains said that it is 
important to note that the topic of discussion in their study was difficult, as many 
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different arguments could be raised, there was no obvious best solution, there were moral 
implications involved, and the decision had to be produced under time pressure. Hogg 
and Hains’ study found friendship to be weakly and negatively associated with the 
symptoms of groupthink, while group identification and social attraction were strongly; 
however, with some exceptions, positively associated with the symptoms of groupthink. 
This study is important because it works as an early step in trying to clarify the role of 
cohesiveness in groupthink. 
Adding to the understanding of what it takes for groups to achieve cohesiveness is 
the notion of entitativity. Entitativity is the degree to which members of a group 
recognize or legitimize being a part of said group (Mullen & Copper, 1994). In other 
words, entitativity is the level of perceived “group-ness” that a member feels toward the 
group. The significance of this is that the more perceived entitativity members have 
toward the group, the stronger the group’s cohesion will be. Mullen and Copper 
suggested that cohesion is stronger among groups who have entitativity and a “higher 
degree of group-ness” (p. 213). The more group members legitimize the group, the 
stronger the bond will be between members because they recognize the group to be real. 
If someone does not perceive the group to be legitimate, they will not cooperate as much 
with fellow group members because they do not value the group. Those who do not 
cooperate may be likely to play the role of the devil’s advocate; which is in opposition to 
those who choose to cooperate and go along with the group, potentially contributing to 
groupthink.  
When looking to increase group cohesion, it is important to note that there are a 
number of ways to improve it. Cohesiveness is higher in smaller-sized groups 
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(Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1990), enhanced by self-sacrifice (Prapavessis & 
Carron, 1997), increased by participation in team goal setting (Brawley, Carron, & 
Widmeyer, 1993), and is improved by democratic leader behavior (e.g., Kozub, 1993; 
Westre & Weiss, 1991). Additionally, according to Williams and Hacker (1982), the 
relationship between cohesion and satisfaction is also reciprocal. Other reasons to 
promote cohesion are that greater cohesion has been related to collective efficacy (e.g., 
Paskevich, Brawley, Dorsch, & Widmeyer, 1999), tolerance of the negative impact of 
disruptive events (e.g., Brawley, Carron, & Widmeyer, 1988), assuming responsibility for 
negative outcomes (e.g., Brawley, Carron, & Widmeyer, 1987), conformity to group 
norms (e.g., Shields, Bredemeier, Gardner, & Boston, 1995), and adherence behavior 
(Prapavessis & Carron, 1977). However, despite all of these so-called positive aspects of 
cohesiveness, too much of these aspects and too much cohesiveness may not always help 
to lead to a better group performance.  
Cohesiveness also has its drawbacks, and it is important to recognize that the 
negative consequences associated with group cohesiveness are very real and too 
prominent to ignore. Paskevich, Estabrooks, Brawley, and Carron’s (2001) study related 
cohesion to a pressure to conform, groupthink, and deindividualization. In addition, 
according to Paskevich et al., one reason why the negative consequences of cohesion 
have not been studied or even acknowledged very often is that researchers have accepted, 
incorrectly, that cohesion is always beneficial and, therefore, encouraged it. Additionally, 
cohesiveness is often linked to the skills and immediacy behaviors produced by the group 
leader. However, when the group leader improperly manages group communication 
processes or puts the focus on herself/himself, groupthink becomes a very real risk. 
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Promotional Leadership 
Of all of the antecedents of groupthink, the one that has received the most 
empirical study is the leader’s promotional stance. Flowers (1977), in one of the first 
laboratory studies on groupthink, trained confederates to lead groups either by promoting 
their own preferred choice or by encouraging group members to express any and all 
possible viewpoints. As predicted, Flowers found that groups with leaders who 
communicate in a way that promotes their own preferences and viewpoints discussed 
fewer facts and brought up fewer solutions than groups with a leader who encouraged the 
expression of different viewpoints. Similarly, Fodor and Smith (1982) assigned group 
leaders based on their need for power. What they found was that in groups where the 
leader had a high need for power and, therefore, was likely to communicate in a way that 
promoted their own viewpoint, discussed fewer facts, proposed fewer alternative 
solutions, and expressed fewer moral concerns than groups with leaders who had lower 
needs for power. Lastly, Moorhead and Montanari (1986) used a path analysis to find that 
groups with more promotional leaders were more likely to discourage dissenters and 
adopt an illusion of morality than groups with less promotional leadership. Moreover, 
Esser (1998) said that there is support for the hypothesis of groupthink that promotional 
leadership indeed relates to the presence of groupthink symptoms, symptoms of poor 
decision processes, and poor decision quality.  
The leadership-groupthink relationship is one area that has particularly seen an 
expansion of research. In an attempt to extend understanding of the leadership-groupthink 
relationship, Ahlfinger and Esser (2001) examined the effect of leadership promotion and 
a predisposition toward conformity in members on the characterization of the group 
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process. The study’s first hypothesis, which said that groups whose leaders promoted 
their own preferred solutions would be more likely to experience groupthink than groups 
with non-promotional leaders, only received partial support. However, groups with 
promotional leaders did produce more symptoms of groupthink, discussed fewer facts, 
and reached a decision more quickly than group with non-promotional leaders. Overall, 
their study provides support for the groupthink hypothesis regarding the effects of 
promotional leadership, but does not support the hypothesis that groups of people who 
are predisposed to conform would be more susceptible to groupthink than groups of less 
conforming members. However, this is still important because it suggests further 
development of better ways to measure groupthink indicators (i.e., groupthink symptoms 
and symptoms of poor decision-making). This idea ultimately leads to the development 
of the present study’s second hypothesis: 
H2: Groups whose leader communicates in a way that promotes their preferred 
choice are more likely to commit groupthink.  
Another difference in leadership is the effects of a participative group leader 
compared to a more directive leader. Cruz, Henningsen, and Smith (1999) found that 
directive leaders could sway hidden profile groups to show strong support for a poor 
decision more often. Additionally, Larson, Foster-Fishman, and Franz (1998) discovered 
that groups with participative leaders had better information sharing than those with 
directive leaders. This is consistent with assertions about the effect of directive leaders on 
information sharing and decision quality in groupthink. As by-products of promotional 
leadership, conformity, self-censorship, and sometimes a false consensus can become a 
side effect of improper group communication processes.  
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Conformity 
When members of a group perceive that they have a unanimous decision, they 
become more susceptible to conclude early. If their perception of unanimity is 
illusionary, then defects in their decision-making process, like failing to appraise 
alternative decisions thoroughly, can happen. According to Courtright (1978), 
“groupthink groups attempt to maintain harmony at the expense of critical decision-
making” (p. 243). A major way in which this concept manifests itself through 
communication during the group decision-making process is self-censorship.  
Related to conformity is the circumstance when groups begin to put pressure on 
and influence dissenters. Janis (1982) considered groupthink to be the result of a non-
deliberate conformity where group members come to believe that their own reservations 
about the preferred group decision are not correct. His inclusion of direct pressure on 
dissenters as a symptom of groupthink suggests that the groupthink process of influence 
can also involve public compliance without private acceptance of the group’s answer. 
Because of this, McCauley (1989) defined groupthink as “premature consensus seeking 
that may involve internalization, compliance, or both” (p. 251). When group members 
begin to doubt themselves or even question their own beliefs, serious problems begin to 
emerge that can cause enormous damage to the group and its decision.  
Related to group pressure on dissenters is when the decision-making process 
includes communicative elements of conflict and hostility. According to Courtright 
(1978), the presence or absence of disagreement, meaning conflict or hostility, among 
group members may be the best discriminator between groupthink and non-groupthink 
groups. Members of groups often impose pressures on each other, which can lead to a 
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false consensus, rather than the truth. A study by Anderson and Martin (1999) found that 
group members who tend to argue only the issues or problems, instead of communicating 
to put down others in the group, also perceive the other group members as experiencing 
satisfaction with the group’s communication and reaching consensus. When discussing 
issues, it is easier for group members to either know or perceive that they have reached a 
consensus. Thus, argumentative members contribute to a positive communication climate 
due to their willingness and ability to take positive and constructive stands on group 
tasks. Janis (1982) said that groups whose members can argue issues freely would also be 
able to minimize their chances for groupthink. However, Anderson and Martin stressed 
the difference between argumentativeness, which is positive, and verbal aggressiveness, 
which is not, because it can lead to attacking other groups members directly and 
personally. They said that behaving in socially desirable ways in groups could inhibit 
constructive arguing. However, group members may perceive that they are not getting 
along if too much arguing occurs, and that group members may respond even more 
negatively toward an aggressive person in their group who just seems to want to disagree 
all of the time.  
It is reasonable to think that certain types of individuals would be more or less 
susceptible to conformity influences. Callaway, Marriott, and Esser (1985) showed that 
groups composed of highly dominant members would be able to resist the conformity 
pressures which characterize groupthink. On the other side, groups made up of members 
who depend upon the approval of others to validate their own actions and therefore are 
predisposed to conformity, would be particularly likely to fall victim to groupthink 
(Callaway et al., 1985). One way to measure an individual’s predisposition to conformity 
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is to use the Concern for Appropriateness scale developed by Lennox and Wolfe (1984). 
Several studies have endorsed the Concern for Appropriateness scale (Johnson, 1989; 
Wolfe, Lennox, & Cutler, 1986; Wolfe, Welch, Lennox, & Cutler, 1985). This leads to 
the study’s third hypothesis: 
H3: Groups with lower levels of communicated disagreements about a perceived 
majority opinion are more likely to commit groupthink.  
One way for group members to communicate disagreements is through asking 
questions. According to Leighter and Black (2010), group members should raise 
questions during group meetings for several purposes, including meeting the goal of the 
group, achieving clarity, helping to structure the conversation, and adding to information 
that does not tell the entire story. When answers are not available, raising questions is a 
valuable and effective communication resource, and it may even be a necessary aspect of 
group discussions and communication (Leighter & Black, 2010). This relates to 
conformity and self-censorship, as members of groups must feel comfortable to either 
question a choice or seek clarification.  
Concurrence Seeking  
A key factor in the groupthink phenomenon is the emergence of “mindguards,” 
which are individuals who work and communicate in a way to protect the group leader or 
the preferred group decision from others. The presence and activity of mindguards 
represents the notion of group concurrence seeking. Chapman (2006) said that 
concurrence seeking in groups is the tendency toward convergence and mutual agreement 
in problem-solving. Groupthink is the term used to describe a situation where 
concurrence seeking emerges before a problem or proposed solution has been sufficiently 
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analyzed or evaluated. According to Longley and Pruitt (1980), the term groupthink is 
appropriate only when concurrence seeking within a group emerges prematurely, thus 
decreasing thinking and discussion, and increasing the possibility of a poor decision 
outcome. McCauley (1989) said that the experience of concurrence seeking in groups 
differs as individual confidence in the decision favored by the group changes. McCauley 
also observed evidence that group members may suppress their own doubts about a group 
decision even if it is actually the best choice. Concurrence seeking seems to produce 
compliance in groups (Henningsen et al., 2006). Additionally, McCauley showed that 
concurrence seeking appears to be independent of individual endorsement of a decision. 
Concurrence seeking can occur when individuals strongly believe in a decision or when 
individuals are uncertain about a decision as long as there is pressure on group members 
to favor a course of action. When members of a group are confident that the decision 
favored by the group is the right decision, they may be unlikely to notice pressures that 
encourage them to agree with the group’s choice (Henningsen et al., 2006). Being 
unaware of structures causing a group member to self-censor can be just as dangerous as 
the person realizing what is happening, because they will never have the chance to 
address the faulty process trapping the group.  
 The groupthink symptoms of illusion of morality, illusion of invulnerability, and a 
perception of group consensus all can occur when concurrence seeking behavior are 
perceived as reflecting a group confidence in the preferred group decision. Group 
members with little doubt about the choice favored by the group, who also receive 
feedback from other group members favoring the decision, will be more prone to view 
themselves as invulnerable and moral than those who have concerns about the group’s 
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choice. According to Henningsen et al. (2006), the more confidence in a decision 
instilled, the less susceptible to failure or moral challenges the decision can seem, and the 
more likely others in the group can seem to agree with the decision. Pressures of 
concurrence reinforce and strengthen an individual’s acceptance of the group’s decision.  
 When group members have their doubts about a position clearly favored by the 
group, they can become more cognizant of the communicative pressures on them to go 
along with the group’s favored choice. In cases like this, pressures of concurrence can be 
more noticeable because they will work against the individual expressing their doubts or 
concerns. These pressures will act to promote compliance with the group’s decision 
(Henningsen et al., 2006). When faced with pressures of concurrence seeking, members 
of groups should find it more difficult to challenge the group’s decision. Symptoms such 
as pressure to conform and mindguards reflect recognition of a group’s pressure to 
concur, and self-censorship reflects recognition of a group’s pressures against dissenters 
(Henningsen et al., 2006). Additionally, the pressure one faces to go along with the 
group’s choice can create uneasiness within group members who simply comply. This 
uneasiness and the perception that what the group is doing may not be the best decision 
can lead to group members to think people outside of the group will judge them more 
harshly. This leads to the study’s next hypothesis: 
H4: Groups whose members communicate higher levels of consensus are more 
prone to commit groupthink.  
Anxiety 
Anxiety follows concurrence seeking because groups sometime use concurrence 
seeking to help each other, or the group as a whole, deal with high levels of anxiety or 
31 
stress. Janis (1972) theorized that groupthink emerged when groups faced a decision task 
in a provocative situational context involving a moral dilemma or high risk of material 
losses. Such situations are stressful, meaning that they make the decision makers anxious 
and fearful of not being able to cope adequately. According to Janis (1982), the stress in 
situations like these is intensified when the group has failed previously. From Janis’ 
perspective, this group anxiety relates to concurrence seeking and cohesiveness since 
concurrence seeking is a way of searching for and providing mutual support to help group 
members cope with their anxiety and other emotions. Additionally, this stress-reducing 
tendency is more likely in groups that are highly cohesive.  
The antecedent condition of the provocative situational context, which produces 
stress and anxiety, has received little attention from researchers. Given its importance in 
the original groupthink model, this is a surprising. Callaway et al. (1985) found support 
for the hypothesis that concurrence seeking is a stress-reducing process and is not 
moderated by the occurrence of decision-making procedures. Turner et al. (1992) 
manipulated the variables of stress and found more rationalization behaviors in 
information processing when levels of stress were high. Moorhead et al. (1991) asserted 
the need of more groupthink studies on stress and anxiety, and Chapman (2006), said, 
“stress and anxiety have been overlooked in research, leaving a central tenant of the 
groupthink model untested” (p. 1395). Due to the importance of anxiety in the original 
groupthink model, it is important to account for it. 
Anxiety can affect the communication and process of decision-making groups in a 
number of ways. According to Chapman (2006), “anxiety is a stress-induced emotion that 
figures large in the groupthink model” (p. 1396). It involves an unpleasant emotional 
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state in anticipation of exposure to danger or threat. Anxiety is a continuous feeling of 
low intensity, having much in common with fear, but with an orientation to future 
problems rather than immediate threat or harm (English & English, 1958). Anxiety 
appears to have a damaging effect on decision makers by affecting the ways in which 
they process information. Generally, information processing is poorer under negative 
affect. Next, anxiety may cause a tendency toward excessive risk taking in some 
situations. Lastly, anxiety can divert attention away from the problem at hand as the 
reduction of anxiety operates as an implicit motivator, where decision makers become 
more concerned with reducing the feelings of anxiety, than with finding the best solution 
to the current problem (Chapman, 2006). When a group is more concerned with reducing 
their feelings of anxiety as opposed to focusing on making the best decision, groupthink 
become a very real and looming possibility.  
Anxiety, coupled with negative emotions, puts group decision makers in a 
difficult situation. Research on negative emotions indicates that being in this state 
typically has a damaging effect on the abilities of decision makers and their 
communication (Chapman, 2006). Mittal and Ross (1998) said that people in a negative 
emotional state process information more systematically, while those in a positive state 
do it more strategically. Overall, the quality of decisions made in a positive mood state is 
better. According to Garling, Biel, and Gustafsson (1998), environmental uncertainty is 
one factor that stimulates stress and anxiety. Environmental factors on uncertainty, such 
as external pressure on the group from outsiders, relates to the idea of a provocative 
situational context in the original groupthink model.  
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When splitting or decreasing someone’s resources and thinking due to anxiety, 
their ability to make an effective decision and communicate as such is tarnished. 
Heightened levels of stress interfere with optimal human functioning, as stress creates an 
imbalance between environmental demands and an individual’s resources to cope 
(Chapman, 2006). Evans and Cohen (1987) said that people generally seek to reduce or 
minimize uncertainty and prefer environments that are more predictable and controllable. 
According to Leon and Revelle (1985), the efforts to reduce uncertainty interfere with or 
may limit the full capacity for cognitive functioning. An example of this would be an 
increase in errors on cognitive tasks.  
One theory that helps explain the role of anxiety in groupthink is decision conflict 
theory. Janis and Mann (1977) proposed a “decision conflict theory” concerning the 
effects of stress on information processing. This theory contends that decision makers, 
while under stress, resort to “hypervigilant” strategies for information processing. These 
communicative strategies become representative of frantic searches for a solution, a 
failure to consider all alternatives, and disorganization and rapid shifting among possible 
solutions. Baradell and Klein (1993) supported decision conflict theory when they 
investigated the effects of anxiety on the quality of decision-making performance. 
Naturally occurring life stressors, such as undesirable life events or daily hassles, can 
produce automatic reactions that group members perceive as anxiety (Chapman, 2006). 
These kinds of reactions demand attention, leaving group members with less capacity to 
cope with the task, which could ultimately result in impaired decision-making. 
Related to feelings of anxiety is the concept of mood. Mittal and Ross (1998) said 
that people in a positive mood state tend to be less likely to take risks, and that they tend 
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to be more against risk taking when the decision is framed as a potential gain. On the 
other side, people under negative affect are more likely to take risks than those in a 
neutral state (Mano, 1992, 1994). The “mood maintenance hypothesis” serves as a 
theoretical explanation for the effects of emotion on risk taking in decision-making 
groups. According to Isen and Patrick (1983), this suggests that decision makers are 
motivated to manage their mood state. Those in a positive mood state want to stay that 
way and avoid risk taking, because failure could induce a mood change. However, people 
under negative affect are motivated to feel better and are therefore prepared to take risks 
and communicate as such (Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 2004; Mittal & Ross, 1998). In cases of 
groupthink, the increased chance of risk taking can cause a group not to consider fully 
possible alternative or consequences of their decision. 
Being preoccupied with one’s anxiety clearly has negative consequences 
concerning group decision-making. According to Carlson and Hatfield (1992), “anxiety 
elicits a defensive response that is often at the cost of considerable self-deception and loss 
of contact with reality” (p. 33). The defensive response, according to Rycroft (1968), has 
three modes: controlling one’s feelings or those of others, denying the reality of the 
threat, and seeking an escape from the situation. These communicative responses relate to 
the groupthink concepts of concurrence seeking, mindguarding, minimization of 
outsiders, and a sense of invulnerability. Chapman (2006) said that “the anxiety reduction 
process, which involves engaging in protective modes and defense mechanisms, is a 
distraction that lowers the chances of a sound choice being made” (p. 1398). Overall, 
there is enough evidence to support the idea that decision makers tend to be less attentive 
when they are anxious. This leads to the present study’s fifth hypothesis: 
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H5: Groups whose members communicate experiencing high amounts of anxiety 
or stress will be more likely to commit groupthink.  
In sum, when under negative effect, people are not as strategic in the way they 
gather and evaluate information; therefore, they become inclined toward making riskier 
decisions. Chapman (2006) characterized these tendencies in the groupthink model as the 
symptoms of defective decision-making, including incomplete surveying of alternatives, 
selective bias, and the failure to examine risks. Under negative effect, decision makers 
also divide their efforts between making the choice and managing their mood state, 
increasing the possibility of a poorer outcome.  
Collective Efficacy 
Collective efficacy is the circumstance in which a group can begin to become 
over-confident with its decision and become complacent with its communication and 
decision-making process. In a newly proposed groupthink model, Whyte (1998) 
suggested that the symptoms of groupthink are due to overconfidence, or an excessive 
level of collective efficacy. Whyte’s view draws on the notion of decision framing as 
people respond differently to problems framed in terms of perceived losses, as compared 
to those framed as perceived gains. People tend to be more opposed to risk in situations 
involving gains, but when the situation is described as leading to potential losses, they are 
more risk-seeking (Whyte, 1998). According to Whyte, framing effects lead to risk-
seeking in groups where perceptions of collective efficacy exceed actual capacity, or 
when a strong “can do” attitude causes groups to take excessive risks to avoid the 
possible loss of a desired outcome.  
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Collective efficacy as a concept is derived from the notion of perceived self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1986), which is a key idea in Bandura’s (1977, 1986) social cognitive 
theory. Self-efficacy refers to a judgment about one’s capability to perform a specific 
task. It is task-specific self-confidence. Bandura (1986) describes self-efficacy as 
“people’s judgments of their own abilities to organize and execute courses of action 
required to attain a desired performance. It is concerned not with the skills one has, but 
with the evaluations of what one can do” (p. 319). Bandura (1982, 1986) has suggested 
that the belief of efficacy extends to groups, or even nations. Bandura (1986) referred to 
group member’s beliefs that “they can solve their problems and improve their lives 
through concerted effort” (p. 449). Bandura (1997) defined perceived collective efficacy 
as “a group’s belief in their joined efforts to organize and execute the courses of action 
required to reach their goals” (p. 477). Therefore, group or collective efficacy is a shared 
belief about the group’s ability to successfully perform a task. 
Collective efficacy affects communication and the group decision-making process 
in terms of goal setting, the amount of effort they use, and copying behaviors. Bandura 
(1997) says that perceptions of collective efficacy:  
Influence the type of future groups seek to achieve, how they manage their 
resources, the plans and strategies they construct, how much effort they put into 
their group endeavor, their staying power when collective efforts fail to produce 
quick results or encounter forcible opposition, and their vulnerability to 
discouragement. (p. 478)  
Positively related to perceptions of collective efficacy is group performance (Earley, 
1993; Hodges & Caron, 1992; Prussia & Kinicki, 1996; Riggs, Warka, Babasa, 
37 
Betancourt, & Hooker, 1994). The more positive people’s judgments of their collective 
efficacy are, the more they can accomplish. 
Although collective efficacy has its benefits, the risks of such patterns cannot be 
ignored, especially when it comes to groupthink. Perceived personal and collective 
efficacy may normally be desirable, “but there are circumstances in which this 
assumption is questionable” (Whyte, 1998, p. 189). For example, efficacy beliefs may be 
hazardous to hold in situations where an individual or group initiates failing courses of 
action. According to Staw and Ross (1987), there is a well-documented bias toward 
staying the course in such circumstances, even when this may make things worse. Whyte, 
Saks, and Hook (1997) showed that there is a tendency to escalate commitment to a 
losing course of action, at least at the individual level of analysis, by increasing strong 
efficacy beliefs. Both forms of efficacy perceptions affect the escalation tendency 
because both perceived self and collective efficacy influence staying power when 
individual and group efforts fail to produce results (Whyte, 1998). When a group 
communicates more commitment to a plan or decision that is incorrect without exploring 
other options or allowing for dissenting opinions, groupthink is likely occurring. This 
leads to the study’s sixth hypothesis: 
H6: Groups whose members communicate noticeably higher levels of perceived 
collective efficacy will be more likely to commit groupthink.  
Perceived collective efficacy may be problematic when it becomes too high, 
resulting in overconfidence and ultimately poor performance. High collective efficacy 
seems to be a positive development, but such conditions do not necessarily foster learning 
and high performance. Consistent prior success induces high self-efficacy (Bandura & 
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Jourden, 1991), but also induces groupthink concepts of overconfidence, complacency, 
and decreased search and attention (Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995; Sitkin, 1992). The 
development of upward spirals of collective efficacy might be prolonged and aggravated 
through groupthink symptoms such as collective rationalizations, self-censorship, and an 
illusion of unanimity.  
Hidden Profiles 
Deliberation can be defined as involving free, equal, and respectful discussion 
among group members who collaborate in analyzing an issue or situation and aim to 
come to a “rationally motivated consensus” (Cohen, 1997, p. 74). Ryfe (2005) said that 
the way in which problems are collectively addressed is the key to successful 
deliberation. Groups will likely talk their way out of deliberating, as they instead will 
“hunker down” to do the difficult job of sifting through the various choices and decisions 
that lie ahead of them. Ryfe added that successful deliberation not only helps groups to 
evaluate their choices, but also provides the cultural glue that keeps them engaged in the 
task. Successful deliberation is reliant upon everyone in the group sharing all of the 
information about a given problem they possess. However, members of groups do not 
always communicate all of the information they possess during discussions. This failure 
to communicate information often can result in poor or suboptimal decision-making. 
According to Bonito, DeCamp, and Ruppel (2008), the fundamental problem is that 
shared information is typically discussed more frequently during discussions than unique 
information is. As a result, group outcomes typically suffer. Research has shown that 
groups tend to perform poorly or make bad decisions largely because members of the 
group do not always communicate unique information, and when unique information is 
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contributed, it often fails to influence the group or be recognized and treated as important 
(Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003; Stasser & Titus, 2003). This can cause a cycle of self-
censorship, where a group member realizes their information or input becomes ignored, 
and they might stop providing information that may be helpful.  
If group members do not communicate all of the information in their possession, 
they could be contributing to the occurrence of groupthink by not creating discussion of 
alternative ideas. According to Henningsen et al. (2006), a “hidden profile” is created 
when decision-relevant information communicated to others favors a suboptimal 
decision, but information held privately by individuals instead favors a better choice. 
Stasser and Titus (1985) found that groups tend not to make the best decision, but instead 
choose the group majority’s initially favored option. The hidden profile problem is very 
similar to the issue of compliance pressure in groupthink (Henningsen et al., 2006). 
Group members can hold information that contradicts the group’s decision preference, 
but there is a tendency for that information to not be communicated due to pressures of 
compliance (e.g., Cruz, Boster, & Rodriquez, 1997). Additionally, raising information 
that is inconsistent with the group’s pre-discussion preferences is often treated as less 
important and as less credible than information that is consistent with the group’s 
preference (Greitmeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Henningsen & Henningsen, 2003). This 
relates to the idea discussed earlier of a group member beginning to feel ignored or not 
respected, causing them to self-censor.  
Group confidence, or efficacy, is one issue related with hidden profiles that can 
have a profound effect on how the group conducts itself and goes about making its 
decision. Henningsen et al. (2006) found that group members with full information 
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communicate a greater confidence in the group’s decision than members in hidden profile 
groups. What this means is that hidden profile groups have less confidence than groups 
with full information; likely because they know they do not have all of the information 
and, therefore, do not become overconfident or think they are invulnerable. Conversely, 
groups with more information are more confident in their choice, creating an illusion of 
invulnerability, which can make them more likely to fall victim to groupthink or suffer 
from a disastrous choice. Henningsen et al. also concluded that hidden profile groups had 
more pressure to conform and were more likely to experience mindguards than groups 
with full information. Additionally, members of hidden profile groups felt that they 
engaged in more self-censoring behaviors and were more likely to have biased 
perceptions of out-groups. On the other hand, groups with full information had higher 
perceptions of invulnerability, as well as high perceptions of morality and consensus. 
Thus, the conditions surrounding hidden profile groups work to promote the chances of 
groupthink, which leads to the study’s seventh hypothesis: 
H7: As the number of members in a group with hidden profiles (privately held 
information) increases, the propensity to commit groupthink also increases. 
Trust 
Trust within teams is a function of other team members’ perceived ability and 
integrity, and its main function is to provide synergistic relations, or “teamthink” (Manz 
& Neck, 1995). Trust preforms this important function by activating appropriate social 
processes, such as: broad and flexible role definition, intensive social relations, high 
confidence in others, help-seeking behavior, a free exchange of information, giving 
priority to team objectives or needs, and high commitment and solidarity (Jones & 
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George, 1998). Because of this, trust is a required condition for teamwork and effective 
communication.  
 However, too much trust can be risky or could result in groupthink, as group 
members begin to self-censor as to not deviate from the perceived consensus (Erdem, 
2003). Additionally, the team can apply social pressures to those who argue or disagree 
with the team’s shared beliefs. Together, they try to rationalize decisions within their 
values and norms, and in all situations, pursue agreement. According to Manz and Neck 
(1995), when teams do not discuss or sufficiently analyze alternative decisions or ways of 
thinking due to trust, they increase the possibility of wrong or ineffective decision-
making. This understanding of too much trust becoming a negative concept in group 
decision-making leads to the study’s eighth hypothesis: 
H8: Groups whose members communicate higher levels of trust will be more 
likely to commit groupthink.  
 Finding the appropriate amount of trust is something that does not come easy to 
groups. According to Erdem (2003), the ideal level of trust suggests realizing both the 
positive aspects of trust and distrust simultaneously, and eliminating or minimizing the 
negative aspects of both constructs. At the optimal level, team members trust each other 
and express their views freely, behave altruistically, share information and resources and 
display good, intentional behavior, but must “also exhibit the signs of distrust in 
searching for diversity, defending alternative solutions, being less rigid, retaining a 
degree of skepticism, and inquiring and criticizing” (Erdem, 2003, p. 230). In sum, then, 
too much trust can negatively influence team performance, and in order to maximize 
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performance, teams should exhibit critical inquiry skills and constructive criticism adding 
to a supportive understanding.  
Predicting Groupthink 
A major focus of this study is to show that the combination of these predictor 
variables can work together to put a group’s decision-making process in peril, and 
introduce an increased risk of making a disastrous decision or causing a nagging problem. 
However, also worth of discovery is which variables best predict groupthink. This leads 
to the study’s final research question: 
RQ3: Which predictor variables (highly cohesive groups, promotional leadership, 
conformity, concurrence seeking, anxiety, collective efficacy, hidden profiles, and 
trust) are the strongest predictors of the groupthink phenomenon? 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
One reason for the lack of comprehensive empirical research on groupthink could 
be the lack of appropriate instruments for measuring groupthink or its variables. The 
catch-22 involved, and the potential reason these efforts have not been completed before, 
is that groupthink is very tough to understand or predict looking ahead, without the use of 
retrospective sensemaking. Even with the appropriate antecedents of groupthink in place, 
and with similar communication processes as the errors made by groupthink groups, 
groupthink does not always occur. Simply put, what appears to cause groupthink does not 
always cause it. The disastrous outcomes are almost due to random chance. However, if 
an instrument can be developed to consistently and accurately measure the variables 
associated with groupthink, that still represents a positive step in understanding the group 
communication process and how to make the best of the these situations.     
Participants 
 The research participants used in this study to develop a scale to more effectively 
measure a group’s propensity toward the phenomenon of groupthink included university 
faculty, staff, and students, as well as working professionals in the community, and 
coaches in the community. Additionally, participants included those who had access to 
the School of Communication’s Research Pool webpage over the course of both the fall  
and the spring semesters. All students enrolled in a communication course at the 
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university were granted access to the research pool in which the survey was located. 
After completion of the survey, some students received the opportunity to earn extra 
credit for their participation at the discretion of their instructor. Participation in the study 
was voluntary, and the criteria for participating in the study was that participants must 
have turned 18 years of age at the time of the study and must have been involved with 
one decision-making group experience within the last year.  
The reason for the research participants was to create a large enough sample to 
establish validity for the survey instrument, and to cast a wide net at different 
professional sites to create a more diverse and representative sample. An initial estimate 
of 250-350 participants was targeted, with permission for 500 participants granted by the 
University’s institutional review board. When it comes to the campus community, a 
randomized list of 470 faculty, staff, and coaches, balanced by males and females, was 
utilized. Overall, 300 faculty members (150 males and 150 females), 100 staff members 
(50 males and 50 females), and 70 coaches or athletics personnel (50 males and 20 
females) were contacted. When it comes to the participants at professional organizations, 
a network sample was used, meaning that a contact person at each organization was 
asked to forward the survey to others within their organization. The organizations 
contacted included the Normal CornBelters, the Bloomington Thunder, Beer Nuts 
Incorporated, State Farm Insurance, local rotary clubs, and the athletic departments at 
Illinois State University, Illinois Wesleyan University, and Heartland Community 
College. Additionally, working professionals were accessed by utilizing the CRTNET 
listserv, and through social media access, including a mention on the Uptown Normal 
Facebook page. The reason for collecting responses from both student and working 
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professional populations was to make reasonable comparisons and claims between the 
two groups.  
Descriptive Statistics 
A total of 253 participants voluntarily completed the survey. Of those 
participants, 137 were students (54.2%) and 116 were working adults (45.8%). 
Participants represented 17 different types of groups, with a mean group size of 9.84 
members (SD = 15.56). Out of the 210 participants who completed the demographics 
section, 142 participants were females (67.6%), 67 were males (31.9%), and one selected 
other (0.5%). In terms of age, participants fell within the range of 18-83 years of age (M 
= 44, SD = 12.03). Overall, respondents predominately identified themselves as 
Caucasian (n = 181, 86.2%), followed by Hispanic (n = 10, 4.8%), African American (n = 
7, 3.3%), Bi-racial/Mixed (n = 4; 1.9%), Asian/Pacific Islander (n = 4, 1.9%), Native 
American (n = 2, 1.0%), and other (n = 2; 1.0%). Lastly, 225 (89.3%) participants 
reported that their group met mostly face-to-face, compared to 27 (10.7%) who said their 
group met mostly through virtual channels. 
Research Design and Procedures 
 The University’s Institutional Review Board approved all procedures. To answer 
the research questions and each of the study’s hypotheses, a quantitative survey 
questionnaire was administered through a secure web-based software program called 
SelectSurvey. Participants were instructed in the e-mail invitation to click on a hyperlink 
taking them to a web page that explained the nature of the study and informed them of 
their rights as research participants. The participants indicated their consent to take part in 
the study by clicking another hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage that took them to 
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the online survey. Responses were based upon a previous group experience where a bad 
or disastrous decision was made; therefore, retrospective self-report data was collected. 
Participants were also asked to provide group and individual demographic information in 
order to frame responses and to collect aggregate characteristics.  
Measures 
The survey items were developed specifically for this study. The scales examine 
variables associated with groupthink. The survey item pool was constructed through a 
comprehensive literature review and evaluation of the possible variable predictors of 
groupthink. The review of literature included an SSCI (or Impact) analysis on Janis’ 
(1972) original work on groupthink via the Web of Science database. This allows for 
backtracking and identifying every citation of a particular source across all fields to 
account for missing literature, additional scales, and to make sure no outstanding gaps on 
research within a topic remain unmentioned. Of particular interest were the sources that 
cited Janis (1972), and had then been cited themselves over 100 times. By identifying all 
of the prominent groupthink studies with the help of the SSCI analysis, the independent 
variables and corresponding scales were finalized.  
The eight scales were entitled Highly Cohesive (9 items), Promotional Leadership 
(11 items), Conformity (12 items), Concurrence Seeking (13 items), Anxiety (12 items), 
Collective Efficacy (12 items), Hidden Profiles (9 items), and Trust (10 items). The 
survey items were arranged on a 5-point Likert scale, asking participants to indicate their 
level of agreement with the items, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). To 
control for a variable potentially not applying to a particular group, the respondent would 
indicate “strongly disagree” with a statement, simply showing that one did not believe the 
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statement to be true for their group. For example, within the predictor variable of 
promotional leadership, if a group had zero or multiple leaders, a participant would likely 
“strongly disagree” with the items accessing this predictor.  
Example questions from the Highly Cohesive scale included: “Our group 
communicated a high degree of shared interest,” “Our group focused more on staying 
together than on making the best decision,” and “Members of the group indicated they 
shared many of the same values.” Examples from the Promotional Leadership scale 
included: “Our group leader encouraged others to express their own ideas,” “Our leader 
stated her/his preference up front,” and “Our group leader pushed her/his decision over 
others.” Examples for the Conformity scale included: “I often agreed openly with the 
group’s decision, even if I disagreed privately,” “I often kept my opinions to myself,” and 
“Everyone in the group had a voice.” The Concurrence Seeking scale had questions like 
“I felt pressure from the group to not rock the boat,” “Some group members prevented 
others from expressing opposing points of view,” and “Our group promoted the 
importance of reaching a consensus.” 
Examples for the Anxiety scale included: “Our group’s decision involved risk,” 
“Our group had failed previously, which added to our stress,” “Our group provided 
support to help members cope with expressed stress,” and “Our group tried to escape 
from the stressful situation as quickly as we could.” The collective efficacy scale had 
questions like: “Our group expressed confidence with our decision,” “Our group became 
complacent with our decision-making process,” and “Our group believed in its ability to 
execute a plan to reach our goals.” The Hidden Profiles scale included questions such as: 
“When information that was inconsistent with the majority opinion was brought up, it 
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was viewed as less important than information consistent with the majority opinion,” 
“Our group really only discussed information that was common to everyone,” and “When 
unique information was contributed, it was recognized and treated as important.” Lastly, 
examples from the Trust scale included: “There was a mutual sense of trust within the 
group,” “There was too much trust within the group,” “I often looked to my fellow group 
members for help,” and “I felt free to exchange information about myself with our 
group.” 
In the end, 88 scaled items were included on the survey instrument along with 12 
items requesting information about the group communication and decision, as well as 
various group and individual demographic questions. For example, one of these 
demographic items asked participants to identify if their group met mostly face-to-face or 
virtually, allowing for a comparison of such responses. See the attached Appendix for the 
full survey instrument.  
Data Analysis 
Estimates of Reliability 
Following the collection of data, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient reliability estimates 
were calculated using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). While an 
alpha of .65 to .70 is considered minimally acceptable, a respectable coefficient alpha for 
a scale is .70 to .80, a very good alpha is .80 to .90, and an excellent alpha is .90 or above 
(DeVellis, 2003). According to DeVellis, redundancy of content among items is one 
means of improving the internal consistency reliability of a scale.  
The three-item Highly Cohesive scale produced an alpha reliability coefficient of 
.82, thus indicating very good reliability for the scale. The eight-item Promotional 
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Leadership scale produced a respectable reliability for the overall scale (α = .79), while 
the five-item Leader Dogmatism (α = .81) and three-item Leader Immediacy subscales (α 
= .82) each had very good reliability. The seven-item Conformity scale produced very 
good reliability (α = .82), as well as for the five-item Self-Censorship (α = .83) and two-
item Free Discussion subscales (α = .81). The eight-item Concurrence Seeking scale 
produced very good reliability (α = .82) as well as very good reliability and acceptable 
reliabilities for the six-item Mindguarding (α = .85) and two-item Reservation 
Encouragement subscales (α = .66) respectfully. Both the five-item Anxiety scale (α = 
.87) and seven-item Collective Efficacy scale (α = .87) produced very good reliabilities. 
The three-item Hidden Profiles scale produced a respectable reliability for the overall 
scale (α = .78). Lastly, the eight-item Trust scale produced very good reliability for the 
overall scale (α = .80), as well as very good and respectable reliabilities for the six-item 
Trusting Culture (α = .88) and two-item Overly Trusting subscales (α = .72) respectfully. 
Thus, with the exception of the Promotional Leadership and Hidden Profiles scales, and 
the Reservation Encouragement and Overly Trusting subscales, all other scales and 
subscales had very good alpha reliability estimates. Table 1 shows the 12 composite 
variables in the survey instrument along with alpha reliability coefficients and 
dimensionality for each scale. 
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Table 1 
Composite Variables Measured in the Survey Instrument 
Scale Composite Variable α 
Highly Cohesive Highly Cohesive .82 
Promotional Leadership  .79 
 Leader Dogmatism .81 
 Leader Immediacy .82 
Conformity  .82 
 Self-Censorship .83 
 Free Discussion .81 
Concurrence Seeking  .82 
 Mindguarding .85 
 Reservation Encouragement .66 
Anxiety Anxiety  .87 
Collective Efficacy Collective Efficacy .87 
Hidden Profiles Hidden Profiles .78 
Trust  .80 
 Trusting Culture .88 
 Overly Trusting .72 
Note. The 12 composite variables were measured by eight scales. Four of the scales 
consisted of two factors, while the other four scales consisted of single factors. Alpha 
levels are reported for overall scales as well as for each factor in multidimensional scales. 
 
Reverse Coding of Items 
Due to the reverse polarity of item wording, several items were reverse coded 
prior to conducting factor analysis and reliability estimates. Specifically, items 11, 13, 15, 
17, 19, 25, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 44, 46, 49, 55, 75, 77, 78, 82, and 87 from the original 
survey were reverse coded (see Appendix for item wording). Reverse coding was 
conducted in accordance with making the higher numeric response to an item indicate 
that groupthink was more likely.  
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Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Following the collection of data in the online survey, a series of exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) procedures were run to detect underlying constructs within the groupthink 
scale. The criteria for acceptable factor loadings was .6 or above on the primary factor 
and .4 or below on the secondary factors. Due to the suspected relationship of survey 
items to scaled variables, survey items were grouped based upon their association with 
particular variables. Thus, the use of EFA maintained the separation of variables while 
still permitting examination of potential factors within each variable. A data reduction 
process was also employed during the EFA of the eight scales, identifying factors within 
the eight scales and eliminating survey items that did not adequately load onto a factor. 
After eliminating particular survey items, new EFA procedures were conducted until a 
desirable final factor solution was reached. As the process of data reduction proceeded, 
the item with the lowest primary factor loading that did not meet the 60/40 criteria was 
removed from the solution and a new EFA procedure was conducted. These EFAs and 
scale reliability tests determine the predictor variables that help give insight into the 
criterion variable of groupthink, thereby addressing the first two research questions. 
Groupthink was measured by asking participants to answer the survey questions with a 
group or team experience in mind where the worst decision occurred. At the end of the 
survey, participants were given a definition of groupthink and then asked how many 
times they believe groupthink occurred in their group as well as how disastrous they 
believed the decision to be; thus, resulting in two criterion variables.  
To meet the assumptions of factor analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
coefficient, a measure of sampling accuracy, should be in the high .8s and the Bartlett’s 
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test of sphericity should be significant (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Next, factor structure 
was determined by analyzing several criteria for selecting items that cluster together into 
factors (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Components accounting for 70% or more of the total 
variability should be retained (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Additionally, eigenvalue 
scores, a visual inspection of the scree plot, and the rotated factor matrix helped to 
determine how many factors to retain. According to Kaiser’s rule, only factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 should be retained (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). 
During scale development, it is important that survey items be subjected to factor 
analysis to either identify clusters of items or confirm the suspected groupings of items 
and underlying constructs. Scale development is aided by the use of factor analysis 
(DeVellis, 2003), which is a technique that groups items, or variables, that measure a 
common construct (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). However, factor analysis does not require 
independent and dependent variables to be distinguished (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 
2006). Lastly, sample size and sampling procedures are important considerations during 
scale development. For instance, according to Meyers et al., the recommended sample 
size is a ratio of 10 participants for every variable, with at least 200 participants. 
Importantly, though, a larger number of variables permit the relaxation of this ratio 
(Meyers et al., 2006).  
Multiple Linear Regression 
To further measure the eight independent variables and answer the corresponding 
hypotheses as well as RQ3, two multiple linear regressions were employed. The level of 
significance, or alpha, was set to .05 in agreement with common practices, and no 
changes were made to adjust alpha to a more conservative level given that the results of 
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the study do not endanger groups or individuals in any direct way. The argument for 
using multiple linear regression lies in the interrelationship among variables as found in 
the real world. Researchers generally accept the use of multiple predictor variables 
because the procedure is more representative of “how the world works” than simple 
regression, and can be used for both explanatory and predictive purposes (Meyers et al., 
2006, p. 147). Additionally, multiple regression better reflects the multiple causes of 
events such as the criterion variable, as compared to simple regression or other 
procedures that isolate single causes of events (Miles & Shevlin, 2001). According to 
Meyers et al., research that seeks to predict one variable based upon a combination of 
several other variables justifies a regression design. Lastly, the variables included in the 
regression model should, ideally, be based on as much empirical and theoretical evidence 
as possible (Meyers et al., 2006; Miles & Shevlin, 2001).  
Multiple linear regression analysis uses multiple predictor, or independent, 
variables to predict the scores on a single quantitatively measured criterion variable, 
which is commonly called the dependent variable (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003; 
Meyers et al., 2006). According to Miles and Shevlin (2001), the dependent variable in a 
regression model should be based on continuous data on either an interval or a ratio scale. 
This study meets the criterion set by Miles and Shevlin, showing that summed scales of 
Likert items can produce continuous data on an interval level (DeVellis, 2003). 
According to Hinkle et al., the multiple R value produced by the multiple linear 
regression procedure accounts for the linear combination of the multiple predictor 
variables. The goal in multiple linear regression is to find a set of predictor variables that 
are each highly correlated with the dependent variable, but not with each other, to 
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maximize the variance accounted for by the regression model (Hinkle et al., 2003; 
Meyers et al., 2006). As Hinkle et al. stated, “an ideal set of predictor variables will 
account for different proportions of variance in the criterion variable while having low 
correlations among themselves” (p. 472).  
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CHAPTER III 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
To validate the survey measures, a series of EFA procedures employing principle 
axis factoring with varimax rotation were run to test for underlying constructs within 
each independent variable scale, to identify factors within the eight scales, and eliminate 
survey items that did not adequately load onto a factor. Varimax rotation was employed 
because rotating factor solutions allows for more interpretable results (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2005). As particular survey items were eliminated due to poor factor loadings, 
new EFA procedures were conducted until a desirable final factor solution was reached. 
In total, the iterative EFA process eliminated 39 original items from the instrument 
because of poor factor loadings.  
Highly Cohesive 
For the Highly Cohesive scale, original items 13, 12, 8, 9, 10, and 11 were 
eliminated through iterative EFA procedures. The final EFA procedure produced an 
acceptable single-factor solution. Both the KMO measure (.692) and Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 
259.216 (3), p < .001] were acceptable. The factor explained 62.117% of the variance and 
had an eigenvalue of 2.220. The Highly Cohesive scale consisted of three items and 
produced a very good alpha coefficient reliability of .824 for the scale. See Table 2 for 
factor loadings. 
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Table 2 
Factor Loadings for Highly Cohesive Scale 
Survey Item Highly Cohesive 
6. Our group communicated a high degree of shared interest.      .896 
7. I would consider our group to be highly cohesive.       .781 
14. Members of the group indicated they shared many of the same 
values.  
     .672 
Eigenvalue     2.220 
% of Variance    62.117 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .824 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings.  
 
Promotional Leadership 
For the Promotional Leadership scale, original items 15, 18, and 16 were 
eliminated, while the final EFA procedure produced an acceptable two-factor solution. 
Both the KMO measure (.764) and the Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 710.186 (28), p < .001] were 
acceptable. The two-factor solution, consisting of five items and three items respectively, 
explained 54.729% of the variance in the overall scale. The first factor accounted for 
36.366% of the total variance with an eigenvalue of 3.349, and the second factor 
explained 18.363% of the total variance with a 1.919 eigenvalue. The first factor, labeled 
as Leader Dogmatism, consisted of five items related to the group leader’s agenda, and 
the second factor, labeled as Leader Immediacy, consisted of three items related to 
leader’s approachability. The two-factor solution for the eight-item scale produced a 
respectable overall alpha coefficient of .796. The alpha coefficients for the Leader 
Dogmatism measure (.818) and the Leader Immediacy measure (.822) were both very 
good reliabilities. See Table 3 for factor loadings. 
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Table 3 
Factor Loadings for Promotional Leadership Scale 
Survey Item 
Leader 
Dogmatism 
Leader 
Immediacy 
23. Our group discussed fewer facts because our leader 
had already made her/his decision clear. 
     .727      .192 
20. Our group leader pushed her/his decision over 
others. 
     .692      .375 
21. The leader strongly influenced the final group 
decision. 
     .686      .012 
24. Because of our leader’s comments, our group 
reached a decision too quickly. 
     .685      .222 
22. The group often deferred to the opinions of the 
leader. 
     .606     -.120 
17. Our group leader encouraged others to express their 
own ideas. [Recoded] 
     .074      .799 
25. Our leader was approachable. [Recoded]      .056      .771 
19. Our leader made sure her/his opinion did not hold 
more weight than the group’s opinion as a whole. 
[Recoded] 
     .153      .746 
Eigenvalue     3.349     1.919 
% of Variance    36.366    18.363 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .818      .822 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings for the 
corresponding items and factors.  
 
Conformity 
For the Conformity scale, original items 36, 35, 34, 33, and 37 were eliminated, 
while the final EFA procedure produced an acceptable two-factor solution. Both the 
KMO measure (.797) and the Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 603.949 (21), p < .001] were 
acceptable. The two-factor solution, consisting of five items and two items respectively, 
explained 57.653% of the variance in the overall scale. The first factor accounted for 
43.346% of the total variance with an eigenvalue of 3.466, and the second factor 
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explained 14.307% of the total variance with a 1.358 eigenvalue. The first factor, labeled 
as Self-Censorship, consisted of five items related to the participant keeping opinions to 
themselves, and the second factor, labeled as Free Discussion, consisted of two items 
related to participants’ abilities to express opinions and asks questions. The two-factor 
solution for the seven-item scale produced a very good overall alpha coefficient of .828. 
The alpha coefficients for the Self-Censorship measure (.837) and the Free Discussion 
measure (.819) were both very good reliabilities. See Table 4 for factor loadings. 
 
Table 4 
Factor Loadings for Conformity Scale 
Survey Item Self-Censorship Free Discussion 
31. I often failed to express disagreement with 
what someone else said. 
     .734      .148 
32. I had doubts about the group’s decision, but 
did not say anything.  
     .728      .159 
28. I often kepy my opinions to myself.      .686      .303 
26. I often agreed openly with the group’s 
decision, even if I disagreed privately. 
     .672      .011 
27. I felt a pressure to agree with the group’s 
opinions. 
     .623      .345 
29. I felt free to express any conerns I had with 
ideas that were proposed. [Recoded] 
     .179      .828 
30. I felt comfortable asking questions about a 
solution. [Recoded] 
     .152      .811 
Eigenvalue     3.466     1.358 
% of Variance    43.346    14.307 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .837      .819 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings for the 
corresponding items and factors.  
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Concurrence Seeking 
For the Concurrence Seeking scale, original items 50, 44, 45, 41, and 48 were 
eliminated, while the final EFA procedure produced an acceptable two-factor solution. 
Both the KMO measure (.807) and the Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 673.457 (28), p < .001] were 
acceptable. The two-factor solution, consisting of six items and two items respectively, 
explained 50.959% of the variance in the overall scale. The first factor accounted for 
40.154% of the total variance with an eigenvalue of 3.698, and the second factor 
explained 10.805% of the total variance with a 1.348 eigenvalue. The first factor, labeled 
as Mindguarding, consisted of six items related to group members protecting the 
preferred group decision, and the second factor, labeled as Reservation Encouragement, 
consisted of two items related to group members encouraging others to express their 
doubts about decision options. The two-factor solution for the eight-item scale produced 
a very good overall alpha coefficient of .823. The alpha coefficients for the 
Mindguarding measure (.858) and the Reservation Encouragement measure (.664) were 
very good and acceptable reliabilities, respectively. See Table 5 for factor loadings. 
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Table 5 
Factor Loadings for Concurrence Seeking Scale 
Survey Item Mindguarding 
Reservation 
Encouragement 
38. I felt pressure from the group to not “rock the 
boat.” 
     .774      .108 
42. The group pressured members to agree with 
each other. 
     .723      .171 
40. Members of the group acted as mindguards, 
protecting the group leader or preferred group 
decision from others. 
     .709      .049 
43. As a group, we failed to fully acknowledge the 
opinions of those with a particular experise in a 
given area. 
     .694      .118 
47. Some group members prevented others from 
expressing opposing points of view. 
     .655      .123 
39. I felt presure to just go along with the group’s 
preferred decision. 
     .640      .125 
49. When I spoke up about any doubts I had, my 
fellow group members seriously listened to me. 
[Recoded] 
     .238      .705 
46. The group encouraged members to express 
reservations they had about the group decision 
[Recoded] 
     .023      .698 
Eigenvalue     3.698     1.348 
% of Variance    40.154    10.805 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .858      .664 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings for the 
corresponding items and factors.  
 
Anxiety 
For the Anxiety scale, original items 55, 57, 56, 51, 52, 54, and 53 were eliminated 
through iterative EFA procedures. The final EFA procedure produced an acceptable 
single-factor solution. Both the KMO measure (.848) and Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 503.138 
(10), p < .001] were acceptable. The factor explained 57.748% of the variance and had an 
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eigenvalue of 3.305. The Anxiety scale consisted of five items and produced a very good 
alpha coefficient reliability of .871 for the scale. See Table 6 for factor loadings. 
 
Table 6 
Factor Loadings for Anxiety Scale 
Survey Item Anxiety 
59. Our group failed to consider all possible alternatives to our 
decision due to the pressures of expressed stress and anxiety. 
     .805 
58. Because of our anxiety, our group was frantic in trying to make 
a decision.  
     .797 
61. Members of the group became defensive due to expressed stress.       .754 
60. Our group tried to escape from the stressful situation as quickly 
as we could. 
     .748 
62. I felt fear or anxiety over the group’s task.      .690 
Eigenvalue     3.305 
% of Variance    57.748 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .871 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings.  
 
Collective Efficacy 
For the Collective Efficacy scale, original items 66, 65, 74, 72, and 64 were 
eliminated through iterative EFA procedures. The final EFA procedure produced an 
acceptable single-factor solution. Both the KMO measure (.891) and Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 
663.706 (21), p < .001] were acceptable. The factor explained 50.816% of the variance 
and had an eigenvalue of 4.028. The Collective Efficacy scale consisted of seven items 
and produced a very good alpha coefficient reliability of .876 for the scale. See Table 7 
for factor loadings. 
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Table 7 
Factor Loadings for Collective Efficacy Scale 
Survey Item 
Collective 
Efficacy 
68. Our group believed in its ability to execute a plan to reach our 
goals. 
     .806 
67. Our group communicated a “can do” attitude.       .786 
69. Our group strongly communicated an ability to complete the 
task at hand. 
     .764 
70. Our group was not easily discouraged.      .745 
73. Our group believed we could solve our own problems if we 
worked together. 
     .629 
71. Our group “stayed the course,” even when things looked bad.      .622 
63. Our group expressed confidence with our decision.       .607 
Eigenvalue     4.028 
% of Variance    50.816 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .876 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings.  
 
Hidden Profiles 
For the Hidden Profiles scale, original items 76, 82, 79, 81, 83, and 80 were 
eliminated through iterative EFA procedures. The final EFA procedure produced an 
acceptable single-factor solution. Both the KMO measure (.704) and Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 
178.097 (3), p < .001] were acceptable. The factor explained 54.535% of the variance and 
had an eigenvalue of 2.090. The Hidden Profiles scale consisted of three items and 
produced a respectable alpha coefficient reliability of .780 for the scale. See Table 8 for 
factor loadings. 
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Table 8 
Factor Loadings for Hidden Profiles Scale 
Survey Item Hidden Profiles 
77. Our group often discussed unique information that not everyone 
began the discussion with knowledge of. [Recoded] 
     .756 
75. Everyone in the group shared all of the information they had 
about a particular problem or task. [Recoded] 
     .734 
78. When unique information was contributed, it was recognized 
and treated as important. [Recoded] 
 
     .726 
Eigenvalue     2.090 
% of Variance    54.535 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .780 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings.  
 
Trust 
For the Trust scale, original items 87 and 93 were eliminated, while the final EFA 
procedure produced an acceptable two-factor solution. Both the KMO measure (.823) and 
the Bartlett’s test [χ2 = 768.120 (28), p < .001] were acceptable. The two-factor solution, 
consisting of six items and two items respectively, explained 58.434% of the variance in 
the overall scale. The first factor accounted for 42.592% of the total variance with an 
eigenvalue of 3.804, and the second factor explained 15.842% of the total variance with a 
1.703 eigenvalue. The first factor, labeled as Trusting Culture, consisted of six items 
related to a supportive and helpful group environment, and the second factor, labeled as 
Overly Trusting consisted of two items related to group members expressing too much 
trust. The two-factor solution for the eight-item scale produced a good overall alpha 
coefficient of .805. The overall alpha coefficients for the Trusting Culture measure (.880) 
and the Overly Trusting measure (.725) were very good and acceptable reliabilities, 
respectively. See Table 9 for factor loadings. 
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Table 9 
Factor Loadings for Trust Scale 
Survey Item Trusting Culture Overly Trusting 
89. Our group’s environment was supportive.      .857      .090 
84. There was a mutual sense of trust within the 
group. 
     .780      .211 
90. I had confidence in our group members to 
make the right decision. 
     .760      .012 
92. I felt free to exchange information about 
myself with our group. 
     .755     -.032 
91. I often looked to my fellow group members 
for help. 
     .666      .199 
88. Group members expressed their views freely.      .659     -.280 
86. No one in the group wanted to break the 
feeling of trust by bringing up opposing ideas. 
    -.024      .773 
85. There was too must trust within the group.      .115      .725 
Eigenvalue     3.804     1.703 
% of Variance    42.592    15.842 
Cronbach’s Alpha      .880      .725 
Note. Underlined factor coefficients show acceptable factor loadings for the 
corresponding items and factors.  
 
Summary 
The EFA results support the use of the eight groupthink scales, thus indicating 
that the scales are able to tap into the variables of interest. Results indicated that the 
survey was able to be factor analyzed with acceptable to very good reliabilities after 
eliminating several survey items, thereby answering both research questions one and two. 
Findings indicate that the survey instrument measures 12 distinct scales and subscales 
related to predictors of groupthink, and are conceptually consistent with the domain of 
the variables examined, reflecting the content domain of the scales, and demonstrating 
good content validity (DeVellis, 2003; Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). In sum, the survey 
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was reduced to 61 items, and the results project that the survey instrument is capable of 
operationalizing the predictor variables of interest and testing the relationships among 
those variables. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Correlation 
Prior to conducting the regressions, a screening of the data was conducted to test 
for potential differences between different groups or sets of participants. First, two 
correlations were run to test for differences between groups based on size, one in regard 
to the survey item asking participants to identify the number of times they believed 
groupthink occurred within their group, and the other for the item asking participants to 
rate on a scale from one to nine, how disastrous they believed their group’s decision to 
be. Results produced a statistically significant correlation (r = .13, p < .05) between 
group size and the number of groupthink occurrences. However, no statistically 
significant correlation was found (r = .04, p > .05) for group size and the rating of 
groupthink disaster. 
Independent Samples t-Test 
Next, two sets of independent samples t-tests were run to test for differences 
between face-to-face and virtual groups, and between student and working adult groups. 
First, an independent samples t-test was calculated to compare the mean scores of 
participants in face-to-face groups and those in virtual groups based on the number of 
times groupthink occurred in their group. For face-to-face and virtual groups, the t-tests  
revealed no statistically significant differences (t(.980) = 3.355, p > .05). Therefore, face- 
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to-face groups did not have higher mean scores for the number of groupthink occurrences 
(M = 21.01, SD = 17.86) than did computer mediated groups (M = 17.30, SD = 7.94). 
Additionally, another independent samples t-test was calculated to compare the mean 
scores of participants in face-to-face groups and those in virtual groups based on the 
rating of groupthink disaster in their group. For face-to-face and virtual groups, the t-tests 
revealed no statistically significant differences (t(-.676) = 1.125, p > .05). Therefore, 
face-to-face groups also did not have higher mean scores for the rating of groupthink 
disaster (M = 3.49, SD = 2.57) than did computer mediated groups (M = 3.87, SD = 2.30). 
Finally, 12 independent samples t-tests were calculated to compare the mean 
scores of student and working adult participants on the 12 composite variables. For 
Highly Cohesive, the t-tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(-1.721) = 
.232, p > .05). Therefore, student groups did not have higher mean scores for 
cohesiveness (M = 3.35, SD = .88) than did adult groups (M = 3.56, SD = .88). For 
Leader Dogmatism, the t-tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(1.647) = 
1.477, p > .05). Therefore, student groups did not have higher mean scores for leader 
dogmatism (M = 3.13, SD = .78) than did adult groups (M = 2.96, SD = .83). For Leader 
Immediacy, the t-tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(2.162) = .062, p 
> .05). Therefore, student groups did not have higher mean scores for leader immediacy 
(M = 2.62, SD = .86) than did adult groups (M = 2.36, SD = .86). For Self-Censorship, the 
t-tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(1.422) = .206, p > .05). 
Therefore, student groups did not have higher mean scores for self-censorship (M = 2.95, 
SD = .83) than did adult groups (M = 2.79, SD = .82). For Free Discussion, the t-tests 
revealed no statistically significant differences (t(.369) = .007, p > .05). Therefore, 
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student groups did not have higher mean scores for free discussion (M = 2.51, SD = .87) 
than did adult groups (M = 2.46, SD = .91). For Mindguarding, the t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant differences (t(2.027) = .274, p > .05). Therefore, student groups 
did not have higher mean scores for mindguarding (M = 3.08, SD = .81) than did adult 
groups (M = 2.85, SD = .82). For Reservation Encouragement the t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant differences (t(-.050) = 3.843, p > .05). Therefore, student groups 
did not have higher mean scores for encouraging reservations (M = 2.70, SD = .79) than 
did adult groups (M = 12.71, SD = .90).  
For Anxiety, the t-tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(1.934) = 
2.612, p > .05). Therefore, student groups did not have higher mean scores for anxiety (M 
= 3.11, SD = .89) than did adult groups (M = 2.86, SD = 1.00). For Collective Efficacy, 
the t-tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(.004) = 1.164, p > .05). 
Therefore, student groups did not have higher mean scores for collective efficacy (M = 
3.41, SD = .71) than did adult groups (M = 3.41, SD = .77). For Hidden Profiles, the t-
tests revealed no statistically significant differences (t(1.252) = .148, p > .05). Therefore, 
student groups did not have higher mean scores for hidden profiles (M = 2.73, SD = .79) 
than did adult groups (M = 2.59, SD = .84). For Trusting Culture, the t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant differences (t(.035) = 1.466, p > .05). Therefore, student groups 
did not have higher mean scores for a trusting culture (M = 3.42, SD = .74) than did adult 
groups (M = 3.41, SD = .85). Lastly, for Overly Trusting, the t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant differences (t(1.638) = 1.961, p > .05). Therefore, student groups 
also did not have higher mean scores for having too much trust (M = 2.72, SD = .84) than 
did adult groups (M = 2.52, SD = .98). The findings for the independent samples t-tests 
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comparing students to working adults indicated that no statistically significant differences 
existed between the groups. Consistent with expectations, the results suggested that the 
two groups of participants did not differ with respect to scores on any of the 12 composite 
variables. Thus, these non-significant findings allow for data from both groups of 
participants to be combined for use in further analysis. 
Multiple Linear Regression 
Two different criterion variable models were run through multiple linear 
regression procedures. Specifically, separate regression models were calculated for the 
number of times participants believed their group committed groupthink, and for how 
disastrous participants believed their group’s decision to be on a scale from one to ten. 
The two separate multiple linear regression analyses, which reveal relationships among 
variables explored in a study, were conducted to test RQ3 and each hypotheses posited in 
the present study. Multiple linear regression analysis controls for the other predictor 
variables measured in the study in order to isolate the ability of any single predictor 
variable to predict a statistically significant amount of variance in the criterion variable. 
There are several methods that exist for entering variables into a regression model. 
However, the method chosen for the present study was a backwards entry method. What 
this means is that initially, all the predictor variables can be entered into the full model 
regression and then, individual predictor variables are removed from the model using a 
backward solution if they fail to make statistically significant contributions to the model 
(Hinkle et al., 2003; Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; Meyers et al., 2006). When interpreting 
the statistical output of a multiple regression procedure, it is essential to evaluate certain 
statistical output. Rejecting the null hypothesis would indicate that multiple R is different 
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from zero in the population, thus meaning that a statistically significant relationship 
exists between the criterion variable and a linear combination of the predictor variables 
(Hinkle et al., 2003). Meyers at al. noted that “the adjusted R2 is a statistical estimate of 
the ‘shrinkage’ we would observe if we were to apply the model to another sample” (p. 
165), whereas beta weights might not be generalizable to other samples. 
Groupthink Occurrence Model 
The first multiple linear regression model was based off the survey item that 
asked participants to record the number of times they believed their group committed 
groupthink, accounting for the first criterion variable in the study. The regression model 
for Groupthink Occurrence investigated whether participants’ reported number of times 
their group committed groupthink could be predicted by a linear combination of Highly 
Cohesive, Leader Dogmatism, Leader Immediacy, Self-Censorship, Free Discussion, 
Mindguarding, Reservation Encouragement, Anxiety, Collective Efficacy, Hidden 
Profiles, Trusting Culture, and Overly Trusting. Therefore, a multiple linear regression 
analysis utilizing a backwards entry method was conducted to predict Groupthink 
Occurrence from the composite variables. After all predictor variables were entered into 
the full regression model, the analysis resulted in nine regression models being calculated 
as individual composite variables failing to make a significant contribution to the model 
were removed one predictor at a time.  
The first regression model predicted 7.4% of the variance in Groupthink 
Occurrence, R
2
adj = .018, F(12, 197) = 1.319, p > .05. The second regression model also 
indicated that 7.4% of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence could be predicted by the 
predictor variables, R
2
adj = .023, F(11, 198) = 1.445, p > .05. Model 3 also predicted 
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7.4% of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence, R
2
adj = .027, F(10, 199) = 1.585, p > .05. 
Model 4 indicated that 7.3% of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence could be 
predicted by the predictor variables, R
2
adj = .032, F(9, 200) = 1.757, p > .05. The fifth 
model predicted 7.2% of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence, R
2
adj = .035, F(8, 201) 
= 1.941, p > .05. The sixth model indicated that 7.0% of the variance in Groupthink 
Occurrence could be predicted by the predictor variables, R
2
adj = .038, F(7, 202) = 2.176, 
p < .05. Model 7 predicted 6.9% of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence, R
2
adj = .042, 
F(6, 203) = 2.511, p < .05. Model 8 indicated that 6.7% of the variance in Groupthink 
Occurrence could be predicted by the predictor variables, R
2
adj = .044, F(5, 204) = 2.906, 
p < .05. Lastly, results of the final multiple linear regression analysis (Model 9) indicated 
that 6.1% of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence could be predicted by the predictor 
variables, R
2
adj = .042, F(4, 205) = 3.300, p < .05. Thus, the significant results of the 
regression procedure indicated that the linear combination of four composite variables, 
Highly Cohesive, Leader Dogmatism, Collective Efficacy, and Trusting Culture were able 
to account for a statistically significant amount of variance in the criterion variable. A 
further summary of each regression model for Groupthink Occurrence can be found in 
Table 10.  
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Table 10 
Groupthink Occurrence Regression Model Table 
Models R
2
R
2
adj R
2 F df1 df2 F P Sig. F
Model 1 .074 .018  .018 1.319 12 197 1.319 .210 .210 
Model 2  .074 .023   .023  .013 11 198 1.445 .155 .909 
Model 3 .074 .027   .027  .116 10 199 1.585 .113 .734 
Model 4 .073 .032   .032  .111 9 200 1.757 .078 .739 
Model 5 .072 .035   .035  .337 8 201 1.941 .056 .562 
Model 6 .070 .038   .038  .343 7 202 2.176   .038* .559 
Model 7 .069 .042   .042  .225 6 203 2.511   .023* .636 
Model 8 .067 .044   .044  .565 5 204 2.906   .015* .453 
Model 9 .061 .042   .042 1.311 4 205 3.300   .012* .254 
Note. An * indicates a significant regression model at p < .05. (n = 209) 
 
In the first backwards step, Reservation Encouragement, β = .011, t = .115, p > 
.05, dropped out after failing to make a significant contribution to the model. Next, 
Anxiety, β = -.029, t = -.340, p > .05, dropped out in the second backwards step, followed 
by Leader Immediacy, β = -.032, t = -.333, p > .05, in the third backwards step. In the 
fourth backwards step, Hidden Profiles, β = -.057, t = -.580, p > .05, dropped out after 
failing to make a significant contribution to the model, followed by Self-Censorship, β = -
.053, t = -.585, p > .05, in the fifth backwards step. Next, Mindguarding, β = .046, t = 
.475, p > .05, dropped out in the sixth backwards step, followed by Overly Trusting, β = -
.056, t = -.752, p > .05, in the seventh backwards step. Finally, in the eighth backwards 
step, Free Discussion, β = .096, t = 1.145, p > .05, dropped out after failing to make a 
significant contribution to the model.  
Analysis of regression coefficients indicated that Highly Cohesive, β = .216, t = 
2.361, p < .05, and Trusting Culture, β = -.338, t = -2.972, p < .05, were statistically 
significant individual predictors of Groupthink Occurrence, meaning that they uniquely 
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explained a significant percentage of the variance in Groupthink Occurrence. Squared 
part correlations revealed that Highly Cohesive uniquely predicted 2.56% of the variance 
and Trusting Culture uniquely predicted 4.04% of the variance. While they were still a 
part of the final model and therefore are important, neither Leader Dogmatism, β = -.141, 
t = -1.961, p > .05, or Collective Efficacy, β = .191, t = 1.898, p > .05, were significant 
individual predictors of Groupthink Occurrence. None of the variables produced TOL or 
VIF statistics indicating collinearity. Beta weights for the final Groupthink Occurrence 
regression model can be found in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
Beta Weights for Final Groupthink Occurrence Model 
Predictor Variables B SE B 
Highly Cohesive   4.175 1.768     .216* 
Leader Dogmatism   -2.986 1.523  -.141 
Collective Efficacy   4.423 2.331   .191 
Trusting Culture  -7.291 2.454    -.338* 
R
2
     .061 
R
2
adj     .042 
F    3.300 
Note. An * indicates a unique significant predictor variable at p < .05. (n = 209) 
 
The final regression model provided support for H1 and H6, and partial support 
for H2 and H8. Thus, as hypothesized, group cohesiveness, promotional leadership, 
collective efficacy, and trust were found to be predictors of the number of occurrences of 
groupthink. In addition, the linear composite of these four predictor variables was found 
to predict Groupthink Occurrence. However, the findings failed to support H3, H4, H5, 
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and H7. In other words, contrary to expectations, conformity, concurrence seeking, 
anxiety, and hidden profiles were not found to be predictors of the number of groupthink 
occurrences. 
Groupthink Disaster Model 
The second multiple linear regression model was based off of the survey item 
which asked participants to rate on a scale from one to nine, how disastrous they believed 
their group’s decision to be, accounting for the second criterion variable of the study. One 
would expect a rating of one to mean very little or no groupthink, a rating of two to four 
to represent very little groupthink, five to be neutral, and a rating of six to nine to mean a 
disastrous decision likely characterized by groupthink. The regression model for 
Groupthink Disaster investigated whether participants’ reported indication of how 
disastrous their group’s decision was could be predicted by a linear combination of 
Highly Cohesive, Leader Dogmatism, Leader Immediacy, Self-Censorship, Free 
Discussion, Mindguarding, Reservation Encouragement, Anxiety, Collective Efficacy, 
Hidden Profiles, Trusting Culture, and Overly Trusting. Therefore, a multiple linear 
regression analysis utilizing a backwards entry method was conducted to predict 
Groupthink Disaster from the composite variables. After all predictor variables were 
entered into the full regression model, the analysis resulted in nine regression models 
being created as individual composite variables failing to make a significant contribution 
to the model were removed one predictor at a time.  
The first regression model predicted 17.3% of the variance in Groupthink 
Disaster, R
2
adj = .122, F(12, 195) = 3.392, p < .05. The second regression model also 
indicated that 17.3% of the variance in Groupthink Disaster could be predicted by the 
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predictor variables, R
2
adj = .126, F(11, 196) = 3.719, p < .05. Model 3 also predicted 
17.3% of the variance in Groupthink Disaster, R
2
adj = .131, F(10, 197) = 4.108, p < .05. 
Model 4 indicated that 17.2% of the variance in Groupthink Disaster could be predicted 
by the composite variables, R
2
adj = .134, F(9, 198) = 4.567, p < .05. The fifth regression 
model predicted 17.0% of the variance in Groupthink Disaster, R
2
adj = .137, F(8, 199) = 
5.106, p < .05. The sixth regression model indicated that 16.8% of the variance in 
Groupthink Disaster could be predicted by the predictor variables, R
2
adj = .138, F(7, 200) 
= 5.751, p < .05. Model 7 predicted 16.5% of the variance in Groupthink Disaster, R
2
adj = 
.140, F(6, 201) = 6.605, p < .05. Model 8 indicated that 15.9% of the variance in 
Groupthink Disaster could be predicted by the composite variables, R
2
adj = .138, F(5, 
202) = 7.635, p < .05. Lastly, results of the final multiple linear regression analysis 
(Model 9) indicated that 15.3% of the variance in Groupthink Disaster could be predicted 
by the predictor variables, R
2
adj = .136, F(4, 203) = 9.133, p < .05. Thus, the significant 
results of the regression procedure indicated that the linear combination of four 
composite variables, Free Discussion, Anxiety, Collective Efficacy, and Overly Trusting 
were able to account for a statistically significant amount of variance in the criterion 
variable. Additionally, this process produced interesting results as every single backwards 
step model in Groupthink Disaster was found to be significant. A further summary of 
each regression model for Groupthink Disaster can be found in Table 12.  
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Table 12 
Groupthink Disaster Regression Model Table 
Models R
2
R
2
adj R
2 F df1 df2 F p Sig. F
Model 1 .173 .122  .173 3.392 12 195 3.392 .000* .000 
Model 2  .173 .126   .000  .005 11 196 3.719 .000* .941 
Model 3 .173 .131   .000  .027 10 197 4.108 .000* .869 
Model 4 .172 .134  -.001  .158 9 198 4.567 .000* .692 
Model 5 .170 .137  -.002  .380 8 199 5.106 .000* .538 
Model 6 .168 .138  -.003  .656 7 200 5.751 .000* .419 
Model 7 .165 .140  -.003  .692 6 201 6.605 .000* .407 
Model 8 .159 .138  -.006 1.381 5 202 7.635 .000* .241 
Model 9 .153 .136  -.006 1.545 4 203 9.133 .000* .215 
Note. An * indicates a significant regression model at p < .05. (n = 207) 
 
In the first backwards step, Self-Censorship, β = .007, t = .074, p >.05, dropped 
out after failing to make a significant contribution to the model. Next, Leader Immediacy, 
β = -.015, t = -.165, p > .05, dropped out in the second backwards step, followed by 
Trusting Culture, β = -.050, t = -.397, p > .05, in the third backwards step. In the fourth 
backwards step, Reservation Encouragement, β = .052, t = .616, p > .05, dropped out 
after failing to make a significant contribution to the model, followed by Mindguarding, 
β = .079, t = .810, p > .05, in the fifth backwards step. Next, Leader Dogmatism β = -
.061, t = -.832, p > .05, dropped out in the sixth backwards step, followed by Hidden 
Profiles, β = .102, t = 1.175, p > .05, in the seventh backwards step. Finally, in the eighth 
backwards step, Highly Cohesive, β = .107, t = 1.243, p > .05, dropped out after failing to 
make a significant contribution to the model.  
Analysis of regression coefficients indicated that Free Discussion, β = .168, t = 
2.336, p < .05, Anxiety, β = .162, t = 2.342, p < .05, Collective Efficacy, β = -.147, t = -
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2.016, p < .05, and Overly Trusting, β = .167, t = 2.434, p < .05, were significant 
individual predictors of Groupthink Disaster, meaning that they uniquely explained a 
significant percentage of the variance in Groupthink Disaster. Squared part correlations 
revealed that Free Discussion uniquely predicted 2.28% of the variance, Anxiety uniquely 
predicted 2.28% of the variance, Collective Efficacy uniquely predicted 1.69% of the 
variance, and Overly Trusting uniquely predicted 2.46% of the variance. None of the 
variables produced TOL or VIF statistics indicating collinearity. Beta weights for the 
final Groupthink Disaster regression model can be found in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 
Beta Weights for Final Groupthink Disaster Model 
Predictor Variables B SE B 
Free Discussion    .480 .206   .168* 
Anxiety    .434 .185   .162* 
Collective Efficacy   -.505 .250  -.147* 
Overly Trusting    .471 .193   .167* 
R
2
     .153 
R
2
adj     .136 
F    9.133 
Note. An * indicates a unique significant predictor variable at p < .05. (n = 207) 
 
The final regression model provided support for H5 and H6, and partial support 
for H3 and H8. Thus, as hypothesized, conformity, anxiety, collective efficacy, and trust 
were found to be significant predictors of the disastrousness of groupthink. In addition, as 
hypothesized, the linear composite of these four predictor variables was found to predict 
groupthink disastrousness. However, the findings failed to support H1, H2, H4, and H7. 
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In other words, contrary to expectations, group cohesiveness, promotional leadership, 
concurrence seeking, and hidden profiles were not found to be predictors of the 
disastrousness of groupthink. 
Summary 
In summary, a correlation demonstrated a significant relationship between group 
size and the number of groupthink occurrences reported, but failed to find a significant 
relationship between group size and the rating of groupthink disaster. Further, the first set 
of independent samples t-tests found no significant differences between whether groups 
were face-to-face or virtual in regard to both the number of times groupthink was 
reported to occur, and the level of disastrousness of groupthink reported. A second set of 
independent samples t-tests confirmed that student and working adult groups did not 
significantly vary in regard to any of the 12 composite variables, which allowed for 
further comparison of the data. Lastly, two regression analyses were conducted using all 
12 composite predictor variables, with one analyzing the number of groupthink instances 
reported by the participant as the criterion variable, and the other analyzing the 
disastrousness of the decision reported by the participant as the criterion variable. For the 
Groupthink Occurrence model, Highly Cohesive, Leader Dogmatism, Collective 
Efficacy, and Trusting Culture were predictors of the number of groupthink occurrences, 
while the Groupthink Disaster model showed Conformity, Anxiety, Collective Efficacy, 
and Overly Trusting to be significant predictors of the disastrousness of groupthink. 
While examining the results of the regression analyses together, H4 and H7 were not 
supported in either model. H1, H2, H3, and H5 were all supported in one of the two 
regressions, resulting in partial support for the predictions in regard to groupthink. Lastly, 
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H6 and H8 received support in both regression models, resulting in an overall support for 
the hypotheses and an answer for RQ3. Overall, these results help to paint a more 
parsimonious picture about what can predict groupthink. There are many different 
variables suggested to lead to the phenomenon; however, this study measured the 
predictors deemed to be the most important, and the results narrowed these variables 
down to six variables that can tap into groupthink either in the form of Groupthink 
Occurrence, Groupthink Disaster, or both.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The primary goal of this study was to determine if groupthink could be assessed 
by a linear combination of predictor variables, thus creating a survey instrument to 
measure a group’s tendency or likelihood toward committing the phenomenon. 
Specifically, student participants and working adults answered a series of questions about 
their group’s communication process. These questions incorporated concepts such as 
highly cohesive groups, promotional leadership, conformity, concurrence seeking 
anxiety, collective efficacy, hidden profiles, and trust. The final data analysis sought to 
determine if the predictor variables were able to account for a significant amount of 
variance in the number of groupthink occurrences and ratings of groupthink disaster. This 
chapter will summarize the findings of the study and unpack the implications for not only 
researchers on the subject, but for groups from all walks of life or areas of society to 
better make sense of their experiences and protect against faulty decision-making 
processes, such as groupthink.  
Summary of Findings 
The overall purpose of the present study was to determine the factors that are 
most prevalent when considering group experiences that are characterized by pronounced 
negative decisions and potentially, by groupthink. More simply put, the research sought 
to determine what makes a group more likely to commit groupthink. The EFA procedures 
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and acceptable reliability estimates indicated that the eight original scales, of which four 
were found to be multidimensional and four were found to be unidimensional, were able 
to be factored into 12 composite variables. Thus, the EFA procedures established content 
validity for the survey instrument (DeVellis, 2003; de Vaus, 2001; Frey et al., 2000). 
Therefore, groupthink can be measured by a linear combination of the predictor variables 
in the form of various scales and subscales. The single-factor Highly Cohesive scale 
consisted of three items, while the two-factor Promotional Leadership scale consisted of 
five items related to Leader Dogmatism and three items related to Leader Immediacy. 
The two-factor Conformity scale was made up of five items relating to Self-Censorship 
and two items relating to Free Discussion, while the two-factor Concurrence Seeking 
scale consisted of six items related to Mindguarding and two items related to Reservation 
Encouragement. The single-factor Anxiety, Collective Efficacy, and Hidden Profiles 
scales consisted of five items, seven items, and three items respectfully. Lastly, the two-
factor Trust scale was made up of six items relating to Trusting Culture and two items 
relating to Overly Trusting. Overall, the development of this groupthink survey represents 
an important step forward in the study of the phenomenon not only in relation to 
communication, but in gaining an inclusive conceptualization and operationalization of 
the concept that can be better accepted and utilized by all. 
Comparison of Groups 
When t-tests were run independently for each factor in relation to whether 
participants were students or working adults, the analysis produced consistently non-
significant results for all 12 composite variables. This was consistent with expectations, 
suggesting that the two groups of participants did not differ with respect to scores on any 
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of the 12 composite variables. When t-tests were run to test for differences between face-
to-face and virtual groups in regard to participant’s reported number of Groupthink 
Occurrence, and their rating of Groupthink Disaster, the analyses again produced 
consistently non-significant results. 
Regression Models 
For the first regression model, a combination of four composite variables, Highly 
Cohesive, Leader Dogmatism, Collective Efficacy, and Trusting Culture, accounted for a 
statistically significant portion of the variance (6.1%) in the criterion variable of 
Groupthink Occurrence. For the second regression model, a different combination of four 
composite variables, Free Discussion, Anxiety, Collective Efficacy, and Overly Trusting, 
accounted for a statistically significant portion of the variance (15.3%) in the criterion 
variable of Groupthink Disaster. When examining predictors individually, collective 
efficacy and trust emerged as a statistically significant predictor of both Groupthink 
Disaster and Groupthink Occurrence, demonstrating the conceptual link between the 
concepts and groupthink. Additionally, highly cohesive groups, promotional leadership, 
conformity, and anxiety all received partial support as predictors of groupthink. 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis stated that as group cohesion increases, the propensity to 
commit groupthink also increases. Cohesion was found to be a statistically significant 
predictor and uniquely accounted for a statistically significant amount of the variance 
under the Groupthink Occurrence model, but was not the case under the Groupthink 
Disaster model. Thus, H1 was partially supported. This is in line with Paskevich et al.’s 
(2001) finding that cohesion is related to groupthink and a pressure to conform, and with 
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Glaser’s (1993) statement that groupthink can develop as a group becomes more cohesive 
and less critical of its own decisions.  
The second hypothesis stated that groups whose leader communicates in a way 
that promotes their preferred choice are more likely to commit groupthink. Promotional 
leadership was found to be a predictor under the Groupthink Occurrence model, but was 
not the case under the Groupthink Disaster model. Thus, H2 was partially supported. 
Therefore, this study was able to reach the same conclusion as Esser (1998) that 
promotional leadership relates to the presence of groupthink symptoms, symptoms of 
poor decision processes, and poor decision quality.  
The third hypothesis deals with the relationship between conformity and 
groupthink. Findings indicate that there is a relationship between conformity and 
groupthink because conformity was a statistically significant predictor and uniquely 
accounted for a statistically significant amount of the variance in the Groupthink Disaster 
model. However, this was not the case under the Groupthink Occurrence model. Thus, 
H3 was partially supported. Therefore, the findings are able to reach the same conclusion 
as Courtright (1978) that the presence or absence of conformity is a significant 
discriminator between groupthink and non-groupthink groups.  
The fourth hypothesis stated that groups whose members communicate higher 
levels of consensus are more prone to commit groupthink. Concurrence seeking was not 
found to be a predictor under either the Groupthink Disaster or the Groupthink 
Occurrence models. Thus, H4 was not supported. This does not coincide with Longley 
and Pruitt’s (1980) conclusion that groupthink is appropriate only when concurrence 
seeking within a group emerges prematurely, thus decreasing thinking and discussion, 
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and increasing the possibility of a poor decision outcome. One reason for this non-
significant finding could be due to the low variance accounted for by the Concurrence 
Seeking scale (50.959%), which suggests that there may be another factor involved with 
concurrence seeking, or that a dimension may be missing that the scale could not explain. 
Additionally, another part of the problem in regard to the instrument itself may have been 
the way the questions were worded. For example, it may be that concurrence seeking 
works in a way that is not always obvious to a group member; perhaps sometimes on a 
subconscious level, making it hard to recall or report later. Or, the failure to support the 
concurrence seeking variable could be a social desirability bias, where participants are 
hesitant to admit to group pressures to agree with the majority opinion. This could be 
especially true if participants were the ones applying this pressure or contributing to a 
negative group communication process. A final reason for not supporting this hypothesis 
could be that it is simply as not as predictive of groupthink as the other predictive 
variables, which is still valuable information that contributes to our ever-growing 
understanding of the phenomenon. This thought, however, is not in line with Janis and 
Mann (1979), who identified concurrence seeking as the entire second stage of their 
original model.  
The fifth hypothesis deals with the relationship between anxiety and groupthink. 
Findings indicate that there is a relationship between anxiety and groupthink because 
anxiety was a statistically significant predictor and uniquely accounted for a statistically 
significant amount of the variance in the Groupthink Disaster model. However, this was 
not the case under the Groupthink Occurrence model. Thus, H5 was partially supported. 
This finding is in line with Janis and Mann’s (1977) decision conflict theory, which states 
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that decision makers, when under stressful conditions, resort to “hypervigilant” strategies 
for information processing, which become representative of frantic searches for a solution 
and a failure to consider all alternatives. This also matches up with Chapman (2006), who 
said that anxiety can divert attention away from the problem at hand as reducing anxiety 
operates as an implicit motivator where decision makers become more concerned with 
reducing their feelings of anxiety than with finding the best solution.  
The sixth hypothesis stated that groups whose members communicate noticeably 
higher levels of perceived collective efficacy will be more likely to commit groupthink. 
Collective efficacy was found to be a statistically significant predictor under both the 
Groupthink Occurrence and Groupthink Disaster models, and uniquely accounted for a 
statistically significant amount of the variance under the Groupthink Disaster model. 
Thus, H6 was supported, and collective efficacy emerged as one of the strongest 
predictor variables of groupthink, providing half of the answer for RQ3. Therefore, this 
matches Whyte’s (1998) claim that the symptoms of groupthink can result from 
overconfidence, or an excessive level of collective efficacy, and also matches up with 
Whyte, Saks, and Hook’s (1997) conclusion that there is a tendency to escalate 
commitment to a losing course of action by increasing strong efficacy beliefs. 
The seventh hypothesis deals with the relationship between hidden profiles and 
groupthink. Findings indicate that there is not a relationship between hidden profiles and 
groupthink because hidden profiles were not a predictor of groupthink in both the 
Groupthink Occurrence and Groupthink Disaster models. Thus, H7 was not supported. 
Therefore, this study was unable to reach the same conclusion as Henningsen et al. 
(2006) that the hidden profile problem is very similar to the issue of compliance pressure 
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in groupthink, and that groups with more information are more confident in their choice, 
creating an illusion of invulnerability, which can make them more likely to fall victim to 
groupthink or suffer from a disastrous choice. One reason for this non-significant finding 
could be that it is hard for participants to report hidden profiles, which work on almost a 
subliminal level, where group members may not be aware of their existence. This is the 
whole idea of a hidden profile in the first place; it is “hidden” and, therefore, is a 
construct with ramifications that are a little more complex, but also harder to measure. It 
may be the case that the best way to get at this concept is through a more experimental 
type of design, with controls to determine the effect of hidden profiles on groupthink with 
more certainty. Another potential reason for failing to support this hypothesis could be 
because, similar to the result of concurrence seeking, there was a low variance accounted 
for by the Hidden Profiles scale (54.535%), suggesting that there may be another 
dimension involved with this factor that the scale could not explain. 
The eighth and final hypothesis stated that groups whose members communicate 
higher levels of trust will be more likely to commit groupthink. Trust was found to be a 
statistically significant predictor and uniquely accounted for a statistically significant 
amount of the variance under both the Groupthink Occurrence and Groupthink Disaster 
models. Thus, the final hypothesis was supported, and trust emerged as one of the 
strongest predictor variables of groupthink, providing the other half of the answer for 
research question three. This also supports Erdem’s (2003) assertion that too much trust 
can be risky or could result in groupthink as group members begin to self-censor as to not 
deviate from the perceived consensus. Additionally, this result is in line with Manz and 
Neck’s (1995) conclusion that when teams do not discuss or sufficiently analyze 
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alternative courses of action due to trust, they increase the possibility of wrong or 
ineffective decision-making characterized by groupthink. 
Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
The major contribution of the present study is recognizing that collective efficacy 
and trust are statistically significant predictors of groupthink, and that high cohesiveness, 
conformity, and anxiety are also predictors of the phenomenon, as individuals should 
work to de-emphasize these concepts within their groups in order to reach a more 
desirable outcome or decision, and to reduce the chances of groupthink. Furthermore, 
promotional leadership was found to be a predictor for the Groupthink Occurrence 
regression model only. Previous research on groupthink showed that there are many 
different variables suggested to lead to the phenomenon; however, this study measured 
the predictors deemed to be the most important, and the results narrowed these variables 
down to six. Overall, these results allow the construction of a more simple way to look at 
groupthink and what can predict it. Additionally, the present study helps to solve the 
catch-22 dilemma involved with groupthink and it has operationalized the concept into a 
more measurable format. The study has successfully begun the process of creating an 
appropriate instrument for measuring groupthink and tapping into its variables. Even 
though groupthink does not always occur given the same set of predictors and decision-
making defects, understanding what can lead to it is of the upmost importance, and this 
study has generated a more precise way of analyzing the groupthink model thanks to the 
predictors and composite variable scales identified through the regression models and 
EFA. 
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Another major theoretical implication of the present study relates to Janis’ (1972, 
1982) original model and conceptualization of groupthink. Although his original model 
has been often criticized and seldom empirically supported, four of the predictor 
variables in the current study based upon or identified by Janis were partially supported. 
Thus, despite all of the critiques of Janis’ model and the conditions he described as 
necessary for groupthink to occur (e.g., Moorhead & Montanari, 1986; Whyte, 1998), 
such as cohesiveness, anxiety, promotional leadership, and conformity, this study has 
provided support for them, statistically speaking, and suggests that his original model and 
predictor variables likely are not far off from what actually takes place. Although these 
original concepts and variables associated with groupthink and predicted by Janis have 
garnered large amounts of research and critique (e.g., Baron, 2005; Fuller & Aldag, 1998; 
Henningsen et al., 2006; Park, 2000), they continue to appear throughout the review of 
literature and are accepted in the present study. Additionally, although the original 
concepts hypothesized to be important by Janis need to continue to be considered, such as 
cohesiveness, promotional leadership, conformity, and anxiety, so should additions to the 
model, such as collective efficacy (Whyte, 1998), and trust (Manz and Neck, 1995), 
resulting in a combination of Janis’ original design and proposed alternatives.  
Practical Implications 
The predictor variables identified as contributing to groupthink through this study, 
and therefore that need to be discussed from a practical standpoint as groups and their 
members should work to avoid them during the decision-making process, or even before 
such processes begin, were trust, cohesiveness, anxiety, collective efficacy, promotional 
leadership, and conformity. Trust and cohesiveness made predicting Groupthink 
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Occurrence likely, while promotional leadership and collective efficacy added to the 
picture surrounding the model. For the Groupthink Disaster model, all four predictor 
variables, trust, anxiety, collective efficacy and conformity, were statistically significant 
predictors. Therefore, it is important to view these variables as solutions and ways to 
guard against groupthink, and it is important to make sure these are not occurring within 
decision-making groups.  
First, although trust is a required condition for teamwork and effective 
communication, too much trust can be risky or could result in groupthink, as how Erdem 
(2003) put it, when group members begin to self-censor as to not deviate from the 
perceived consensus. Groups should work not to apply social pressures to those who 
argue or disagree with the group’s shared beliefs, not to try to rationalize decisions within 
their values and norms, and not to pursue agreement in all situations. When teams do not 
sufficiently discuss or analyze other courses of action due to too much trust, they increase 
the possibility of wrong or ineffective decision-making (Manz & Neck, 1995). This 
understanding of too much trust as a negative concept in group decision-making appears 
to be one of the most notable findings and contributions of the present study in regard to 
groupthink.  
It is not an easy task to find the appropriate level of trust in groups, and it requires 
recognizing the positive and negative aspects of both trust and distrust concurrently 
(Erdem, 2003). Group members need to communicate and work together to express their 
views openly, and to establish strong lines of information and resource sharing. They 
should also search for diversity in opinions and remain skeptical about courses of action 
until all alternatives are inquired about. Each of these recommendations, according to 
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Erdem, function as tools of distrust, but in a positive manner, and, hopefully, help lead to 
a positive outcome. Overall, group members should communicate in a way that is both 
critical and constructive in order to avoid the risk of too much trust negatively impacting 
group performance.  
When it comes to cohesiveness in regard to communication and groupthink, it is 
important for groups to remain critical and ask questions during deliberation. Members of 
highly cohesive groups are less likely to generate truly innovative ideas or approaches to 
a problem because individual effort and attention can become consumed with staying 
within the norms and boundaries set by the group (Hackman, 1992). High cohesiveness is 
seen as a negative occurrence in instances of groupthink as it causes members to not want 
to “rock the boat,” and it certainly does not always help to lead groups to a better 
performance.  
 While certain amounts of group trust and cohesiveness have clear benefits until 
they reach a certain tipping point and can begin to predict groupthink, the next predictor 
variable found to be statistically significant in one of the regression models in this study 
has no clear tipping point. Janis (1982) linked two of the predictor variables found to be 
statistically significant in different regression models in the present study when he noted 
that stress-reducing tendencies related to anxiety are more likely in groups that are highly 
cohesive. Additionally, Turner et al. (1992) found that when levels of stress and anxiety 
surrounding a group are high, group members exhibit more rationalization behaviors 
when trying to process information. This is obviously not an effective way to try to 
circumvent groupthink when the predictor variables of trust and highly cohesive groups 
highlight the need for critical thinking, argumentativeness, and open discussions.   
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In addition to anxiety having a damaging effect on decision makers by affecting 
the ways in which they process information, which is poorer under negative affect, 
anxiety may also increase the tendency toward excessive risk taking in some groups, and 
can divert attention away from the problem at hand. According to Chapman (2006), 
anxiety can function as an implicit motivator where decision makers become more 
concerned with reducing the feelings of anxiety, than with finding the best solution to the 
current problem. This is problematic because when a group is more concerned with 
reducing their feelings of anxiety as opposed to focusing on the problem at hand and 
making the best decision, groupthink become a very real and looming possibility. 
Additionally, anxiety tarnishes one’s ability to communicate about decisions by 
decreasing or splitting their resources and priorities. Chapman said that stress creates an 
imbalance between an individual’s ability to cope with anxiety and environmental 
demands, which interferes with optimal decision processes, and according to Leon and 
Revelle (1985), attempting to reduce uncertainly can interfere with and limit appropriate 
cognitive functioning, increasing the likelihood for errors in cognitive tasks. Lastly, the 
final consequences of being caught up with managing anxiety is that it often elicits a 
defensive response in group members that can result in them deceiving themselves, and 
losing their grip on what is real (Carlson & Hatfield, 1992).  
Next, groupthink and its symptoms have been linked to overconfidence and an 
excessive level of collective efficacy (Whyte, 1998), which is when groups become 
complacent with their communication and process of decision-making. It is the joint 
belief a group has about its ability to successfully perform a task or solve a problem. 
Risk-seeking in groups increases when perceptions of collective efficacy exceed actual 
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capacity or, in simpler terms, when a strong “can do” attitude causes groups to take 
excessive risks to avoid the possible loss of a desired outcome. The hazards of collective 
efficacy extend to groups or group members holding onto failing courses of action, 
almost being stubborn or “thick headed.” This type of attitude can work to make the 
situation or outcome even worse than it originally would have been (Staw & Ross, 1987). 
Research has shown that efficacy affects the escalation tendency and saying power of 
ineffective communication process, procedures, or unsuccessful courses of action 
(Whyte, 1998; Whyte et al., 1997). Overall, the present study shows that groupthink, both 
in regard to Groupthink Occurrence and Groupthink Disaster, is more likely to arise 
when a group communicates higher levels of commitment to an unproductive decision, or 
plan of action, before fully exploring other potential choices or allowing opposite 
opinions to be raised.  
In regard to promotional leadership, groups with leaders who communicate in a 
way that endorses their own preference have been found to discuss fewer facts and bring 
up fewer solutions than groups with a leader who encourages the expression of different 
viewpoints (Flowers, 1977). Additionally, groups with leaders who have a high need for 
power are more likely to communicate in a way that expresses their own viewpoint in a 
prevailing manner (Foder & Smith, 1982), and promotional leaders are more likely to 
discourage dissenting views, adopt an illusion or morality, allow for a lesser discussion of 
the facts and alternatives, and express fewer moral concerns then those utilizing less 
promotional leadership behaviors (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986). Therefore, the present 
study suggests that group leaders should work toward being more participative in an 
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effort to allow for better information sharing and to not sway hidden profile groups to 
show stronger support for a poorer decision.  
When it comes to the final predictor identified as important in the current study, 
conformity, defects during group decision-making, and a failure to consider other plans 
of action can result from group members having the illusionary perception that they have 
a unanimous decision, making groups more likely to conclude too early. This is often 
revealed through self-censorship. Additionally, conformity can cause groups members to 
pressure others in the group to “hold their tongue” (mindguarding), resulting in other 
group members potentially remaining silent even if they disagree with what they perceive 
to be the majority opinion. An overarching theme or conclusion concerning the effects of 
conformity is that serious problems can begin to emerge within group communication 
when members begin to doubt or question their own viewpoints. This process of 
conformity, mindguarding, and self-censorship can often lead to a false consensus. 
Therefore, it is important for group members to exhibit signs and behaviors of 
argumentativeness, which is arguing only ideas presented instead of attacking other group 
members themselves, because it can contribute to a more positive communication climate 
and a willingness to take a constructive stand.  
A final practical implication of the current study is an understanding of the 
predictors of groupthink as skills to learn, practice, and improve upon in an effort to 
avoid groupthink or problematic decision-making processes. Each of the variables 
supported in this study can be viewed as having tipping points wherein they become 
dangerous to the group and its’ communication process. Therefore, by instructing groups 
and individuals about the danger of these potential tipping points and ways to guard 
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against groupthink, the process of treating groupthink as a consequence of poor 
communication and group deliberation can begin; as opposed to the former way of 
examining groupthink based on a certain kind of outcome or decision. Because 
groupthink does not always occur under the same circumstances or set of predictors, but 
sometimes appears to occur by random chance (e.g., Flippen, 1999; Hirokawa et al., 
1988; Kramer & Dougherty, 2013), this can be dangerous as it can set a pattern of bad 
behavior for a group where they come to believe they can get away with their poor group 
processes. When a group believes they can get away with poor decision-making, or even 
groupthink, this makes it even more difficult to coach them on the importance of 
groupthink and how to avoid it. Therefore, we may need to begin examining and 
approaching conditions that predict groupthink as more important to avoid, than 
groupthink itself.  
Limitations 
Although this study provides valuable insight into what helps groups combat 
against the occurrence of groupthink, it is still hampered by a number of limitations. In 
fact, although studies may find statistically significant results that affirm their 
hypotheses, no study is without limitations. One limitation of this study is the way the 
surveys of student participants were collected. Due to the fact that students mainly 
accessed the survey through the research pool webpage, this severely limits the number 
of students who were aware of the survey and able to take it, and also limits the likeliness 
or reasons for students not involved with a communication course to take it. Although 
this method is effective overall, and was supplemented by accessing working adult 
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participants both within and outside of the university, it does inhibit the chances of 
attaining a more diverse sample of student participants.  
Another limitation of this study relates to the composite variables of Free 
Discussion, Reservation Encouragement, and Overly Trusting. These variables, or 
factors, only consisted of two loadings and did not account for as much of the total 
variance as the other factors did. In fact, they accounted for the three lowest variance 
totals of all 12 composite variables. If this study were to be duplicated with revised 
survey questions in the spirit of increasing the variances within these subscales, we would 
potentially see these variables as being more important or significant than they were in 
this study.  
Next, most of the participants surveyed were from the same community. Results 
from different communities, or different regions throughout the country, may vary for a 
number of cultural or other reasons related to participant’s experiences or frames of 
reference. Overall, this research was conducted with a fairly homogenous sample set. 
These limitations limit the generalizability of the findings. Additionally, some 
participants may have been primed as to the nature of the survey because of the general 
group demographic questions that were asked at the beginning of the survey, and if they 
read the informed consent page closely enough. This also could have inflated the scores 
of the questions as there may have been a social desirability bias in the survey. Another 
problem with the current study is the same difficulty every study faces in regard to 
groupthink, which is the challenge of utilizing the kind of cohesive group Janis’ (1982) 
original model uses. According to Moorhead and Montanari (1986), since cohesiveness is 
the primary antecedent condition of groupthink, it must develop over time and be present 
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in some degree before the decision situation in which groupthink might occur for it to be 
truly “antecedent.” The problem with cohesiveness faced in the current study is similar to 
the problem researchers encounter when trying to conduct experimental studies on 
groupthink; although it has been suggested that an instrument allowing participants to 
reflect on their group experiences that likely involved high levels of cohesion has the 
potential to be more successful in getting at the concept of groupthink.  
Lastly, a study’s limitations are often revealed in how the researcher would 
redesign the study if they were to begin again with the knowledge of hindsight. First, 
even though the new survey instrument developed for the present study fared well in 
exploratory factor analyses and demonstrated acceptable to very good scale reliabilities, 
the instrument could certainly be improved in several areas, most importantly with the 
subscales consisting of only two items. Further modification and refinement of these 
subscales would certainly be a worthwhile endeavor. Second, the present study did not 
allow for a comparison of face-to-face and virtual groups. In other words, how do groups 
who meet face-to-face differ or compare to more dispersed groups, or even groups who 
communicate only through virtual channels? Perhaps modifying the survey instrument 
and setting up the study with a more focused effort on gaining participants from virtual 
groups would help to answer this type of question. All in all, this research provides a new 
glimpse at the way groupthink can be affected by a linear combination of eight predictor 
variables: highly cohesive groups, promotional leadership, conformity, concurrence 
seeking anxiety, collective efficacy, hidden profiles, and trust. However, future research 
is needed in order to verify the results and make them more generalizable to all kinds of 
groups from different places.   
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Suggestions for Future Research 
Given the factors that emerged from the data set, ongoing studies of how these 
factors specifically lead to groupthink by conducting mixed quantitative and qualitative 
research are recommended. This research should be complimented with qualitative 
analysis because, by receiving direct responses from participants about how they felt 
during their group experience, one might be able to create more in-depth themes, and 
more or less factors may emerge. Focus groups, personal interviews, and open-ended 
questionnaires would generate a better understanding of how groups operate, how 
groupthink can become a very real risk, and how it can best be avoided. According to 
Schuman and Presser (1979), open-ended questions are useful in discovering spontaneous 
and original responses, and providing a realistic picture of participants’ attitudes, beliefs, 
and experiences. Additionally, this type of deeper explanation would help expand the 
practical implications of this research to best represent and address groups from all walks 
of life. 
Next, this study should be replicated with an even larger sample size in both types 
of participant groups in order to verify the findings and allow for demographic variables 
to better be accounted for. Participant group sizes should also try to be intentionally 
increased to allow for a better comparison of face-to-face and virtual or dispersed groups 
in regard to groupthink. Future research could also conduct studies in different types of 
communities or regions to create a greater understanding of all kinds of groups. As this 
line of research continues, it will continue to be important to determine what exactly 
predicts groupthink and what can be implemented to subdue it. Most people are in some 
type of group in everyday life, where the risks associated with groupthink are often 
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present and very real. It is important to understand what leads to groupthink and how it 
can be prevented. By realizing how one can improve upon the skills associated with 
avoiding these variables in a group, one can become more satisfied and productive in 
their group, and better enjoy their group experience.  
Before getting into the final area of future research identified, the problematic 
nature and catch-22 surrounding groupthink should be addressed and understood in 
relation to potential measurement problems. As previous literature has shown, what 
seems to lead to groupthink does not always cause it (e.g., Flippen, 1999; Hirokawa et al., 
1988; Kramer & Dougherty, 2013). Groupthink seems to be somewhat dependent upon 
random chance or bad luck. Therefore, it is plausible to think that even if research is able 
to account for the right predictors of the phenomenon, we may never have a completely 
predictive measure for groupthink that accounts for a large amount of the variance. A 
high variance in this line of research just may not ever be able to be expected. 
Additionally, if this research consistently achieves statistical significance and low p-
values, it is possible that due to the low variances likely to arise in this area, there is the 
potential for false positive results. Again, due to the natural problems with this concept, 
this risk toward a false positive may be something that researchers in this area will just 
have to live with. Either way, these results cannot and should not be ignored just because 
of low variances, since they suggest that something else may be happening, and if that is 
ignored, then there may be the opposite problem of a false negative. 
Due to the above discussion, a final area of future research relates to the low 
variances accounted for in the two multiple linear regression models. The Groupthink 
Occurrence model accounted for a statistically significant portion of variance (6.1%), 
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while the Groupthink Disaster model also accounted for a statistically significant portion 
of variance (15.3%). Future research should take a step toward understanding and 
identifying the final 93.9% and 84.7%, respectively, of the variance in problematic 
decision-making within these models. Additionally, this hints at the important difference 
between “statistical significance,” and something simply being “significant.” Therefore, 
future research should also address the limitations of the current study, in an effort to 
come up with different ways to measure the rest of the variance in groupthink. Possible 
solutions might be to increase the sample size in each group of participants (students and 
working adults) in order to achieve a more stable factor structure in the scales and 
subscales identified through EFA. Finally, future research should analyze the 
demographic questions asked at the beginning of the present survey instrument in an 
effort to explore the role of such items on understanding groupthink and its associated 
predictors.  
Conclusion 
The present study tested a new survey instrument for advancing the study of 
groupthink and its predictors. The results represent one step in the ever-growing process 
of developing an appropriate and reliable measure concerning groupthink. Additionally, 
results revealed that the various scales and subscales developed in the study are capable 
of tapping into the variable of interest, groupthink, with regard to both Groupthink 
Occurrence and Groupthink Disaster. From here, future studies are needed to explore the 
variables addressed in this project in greater detail and examine the possibility of other 
variables that might influence groupthink. Nevertheless, the findings revealed here 
indicate progress in this line of research and raise other questions which can be addressed 
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in the future. At the very least, a new survey instrument for exploring groupthink has 
withstood the scrutiny of factor analysis procedures and reliability analysis. Furthermore, 
statistically significant predictors of groupthink, such as collective efficacy, trust, highly 
cohesive groups, anxiety, and conformity have been identified through the regression 
models. The Groupthink Occurrence model also identified promotional leadership as a 
contributing predictor. The current investigation explored the impact of eight predictor 
variables, highly cohesive groups, promotional leadership, conformity, concurrence 
seeking anxiety, collective efficacy, hidden profiles, and trust, on groupthink. While 
further research is needed to confirm the findings, this research suggests that collective 
efficacy, trust, highly cohesive groups, promotional leadership, anxiety, and conformity 
can work together towards increasing a group’s propensity toward committing 
groupthink. All group members can work together to address and prevent groupthink. 
Specifically, all parties involved should understand the role the phenomenon plays in 
dysfunctional decision-making and poor decision outcomes, and how the predictors 
identified in this study aid it. Through a greater understanding of what causes groupthink, 
one can enhance their group experiences, overall satisfaction, and productivity in group 
work. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Directions: Please think of past group or team experiences you have had where your 
group made a bad decision. Of those experiences, please focus on the worst decision a 
group or team you have been a member of has made. Then, answer the following 
questions with that specific group or team experience in mind (the group or team that 
made the worst decision). Please continue to keep this particular group or team 
experience in mind as you fill out the rest of this survey.  
 
1. What was the approximate size of this group or team? (number slider?) 
2. How long had the group or team worked together before this bad decision was 
made? (text box) 
3. What type of group or team was this? (multiple response checkboxes; check all 
that apply) Business related in Bloomington-Normal, Class Work Group, 
Registered Student Organization, Academic/Honorary group, Greek Life, Search 
Committee, Panel, Thesis Committee, Scholarship Committee, Sports Team, 
other. (If other, please explain) 
4. Was this group or team a decision-making group? 
5. Did this group or team meet mostly face-to-face or virtually (e.g., skype)? 
 
Directions: Keeping this group or team experience in mind, please indicate how much 
you agree with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
Highly Cohesive 
6. Our group communicated a high degree of shared interest. 
7. I would consider our group to be highly cohesive. 
8. Our group had a lack of diversity in member’s abilities and talents. 
9. Members of our group had worked together before. 
10. Our group respected other’s viewpoints. 
11. Our group ignored opposing viewpoints. [Recoded] 
12. Our group focused more on staying together than on making the best decision. 
13. Our group focused less on harmony than on making the right decision. [Recoded] 
14. Members of the group indicated they shared many of the same values. 
 
Promotional Leadership 
15. Our group leader was impartial. [Recoded] 
16. Our group leader expressed her/his opinion often. 
17. Our group leader encouraged others to express their own ideas. [Recoded] 
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18. Our leader stated her/his preference up front. 
19. Our leader made sure her/his opinion did not hold more weight than the group’s 
opinion as a whole. [Recoded] 
20. Our group leader pushed her/his decision over others. 
21. The leader strongly influenced the final group decision. 
22. The group often deferred to the opinions of the leader. 
23. Our group discussed fewer facts because of our leader had already made her/his 
position clear. 
24. Because of our leader’s comments, our group reached a decision too quickly. 
25. Our leader was approachable. [Recoded] 
 
Conformity 
26. I often agreed openly with the group’s decision, even if I disagreed privately. 
27. I felt a pressure to agree with the group’s opinions. 
28. I often kept my opinions to myself. 
29. I felt free to express any concerns I had with the ideas that were proposed. 
[Recoded] 
30. I felt comfortable asking questions about a solution. [Recoded] 
31. I often failed to express disagreement with what someone else said. 
32. I had doubts about the group’s decision, but did not say anything. 
33. I voiced doubts about the group’s decision. [Recoded] 
34. Our group had a culture of withholding our own opinions. 
35. Members of the group often asked questions to present other points of view or 
play the role of the devil’s advocate (which is someone who questions ideas to 
make sure it is the right choice). [Recoded] 
36. There were many disagreements within the group. [Recoded] 
37. Everyone in the group had a voice. [Recoded] 
 
Concurrence Seeking 
38. I felt pressure from the group to not “rock the boat.” 
39. I felt pressure to just go along with the group’s preferred decision. 
40. Members of the group acted as mindguards, protecting the group leader or the 
preferred group decision from others. 
41. Group members began looking for a consensus before a proposed solution was 
fully analyzed. 
42. The group pressured members to agree with each other. 
43. As a group, we failed to fully acknowledge the opinions of those with a particular 
expertise in a given area. 
44. At least one person at each meeting played the role of the devil’s advocate. 
[Recoded] 
45. There was a lot of pressure from the group to make decisions quickly. 
46. The group encouraged members to express any reservations they had about the 
group decision. [Recoded] 
47. Some group members prevented others from expressing opposing points of view. 
48. Our group promoted the importance of reaching a consensus.  
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49. When I spoke up about any doubts I had, my fellow group members seriously 
listened to me. [Recoded] 
50. We often felt our group decisions were unanimous. 
 
Anxiety 
51. Our group dealt with a lot of expressed stress and anxiety. 
52. Our group’s decision involved risk. 
53. Our group’s decision involved a moral dilemma. 
54. Our group had failed previously, which added to our expressed stress. 
55. Our group provided support to help members cope with expressed stress. 
[Recoded] 
56. Our group’s expressed stress was intensified because of how close we were with 
each other. 
57. Our group took more risks because of the stress we felt. 
58. Because of our anxiety, our group was frantic in trying to make a decision. 
59. Our group failed to consider all possible alternatives to our decision due to the 
pressures of expressed stress and anxiety. 
60. Our group tried to escape from the stressful situation as quickly as we could. 
61. Members of the group became defensive due to expressed stress. 
62. I felt fear or anxiety over our group’s task. 
 
Collective Efficacy 
63. Our group expressed confidence with our decision.  
64. Our group was overly confident with our decision.  
65. Our group became complacent with our decision-making process.  
66. Our group took risks in making our decision. 
67. Our group communicated a “can do” attitude. 
68. Our group believed in its ability to execute a plan to reach our goals. 
69. Our group strongly communicated an ability to complete the task at hand. 
70. Our group was not easily discouraged. 
71. Our group “stayed the course,” even when things looked bad. 
72. Our group tended to increase our commitment to losing courses of action, almost 
being “thick headed.” 
73. Our group believed we could solve our own problems if we worked together. 
74. Our group talked about our prior successes as evidence of our ability to complete 
the current task. 
 
Hidden Profiles 
75. Everyone in the group shared all of the information they had about a particular 
problem or task. [Recoded] 
76. Our group really only discussed information that was common to everyone. 
77. Our group often discussed unique information that not everyone began the 
discussion with knowledge of. [Recoded] 
78. When unique information was contributed, it was recognized and treated as 
important. [Recoded] 
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79. Our group simply chose the option that was initially favored by the group’s 
majority. 
80. When information that was inconsistent with the majority opinion was brought 
up, it was viewed as less important than information consistent with the majority 
opinion. 
81. Our group communicated confidence in our decision because we thought we had 
all of the information available. 
82. Our group was not overly confident because we knew we may be lacking some 
information. [Recoded] 
83. I stopped providing helpful information because I felt I was being ignored. 
 
Trust 
84. There was a mutual sense of trust within the group. 
85. There was too much trust within the group. 
86. No one in the group wanted to break the feeling of trust by bringing up opposing 
ideas. 
87. Some group members displayed signs of distrust. [Recoded] 
88. Group members expressed their views freely. 
89. Our group’s environment was supportive. 
90. I had confidence in our group members to make the right decision. 
91. I often looked to my fellow group members for help. 
92. I felt free to exchange information about myself with our group. 
93. I shared my resources with group members. 
 
Directions: Keeping the same group or team experience in mind, please answer the 
following questions about “groupthink.” Groupthink is the term used to describe how 
certain conditions can lead a group to be highly satisfied with what turns out to be an 
ineffective decision. It is a mode of thinking in which members of a highly cohesive 
group strive for unanimity and consensus, which overrides their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action. The more cohesiveness a group has, 
the more pressure it puts onto members of that group to maintain the cohesiveness. In 
turn, the group invests more of its energy in keeping this cohesiveness intact than it does 
in making the right decision. 
 
94. Do you believe that your decision-making group or team committed groupthink? 
(yes, no, maybe) Please explain. (text box) 
95. How many times do you believe your group or team committed groupthink? 
(number slider) 
96. How disastrous was the result of your group’s or team’s decision? (scale from 1-
9) 
97. How recently did your group’s or team’s last instance of groupthink occur? (text 
box) 
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Individual Demographic Information 
 
98. What is your biological sex? ______Male ______Female ______Other 
99. What is your age? (number slider) 
100. What is your race/ethnicity? 
______African American 
______Native American 
______Caucasian 
______Hispanic  
______Bi-racial/Mixed 
______Asian/Pacific Islander 
______Other 
 
